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RAQUEL ALDANA-PINDELL*

The 9/11 "National Security" Cases:
Three Principles Guiding Judges'
Decision-Making

T

he cruel September 11 attacks exposed the United States'
vulnerability to terrorist acts on U.S. soil, this time from foreign actors perceived as willing and capable of striking again on a
similar or greater scale. The U.S. federal government responded
swiftly and aggressively to these attacks. With approval from
Congress 1 and the Security Council,2 as well as the support of
many nations, 3 the executive launched a military strike against
the Taliban in Afghanistan for harboring al Qaeda, the group
deemed responsible for the attacks. The executive also "declared" an all-out war against al Qaeda, as well as other terrorists
* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. B.A. Arizona State University; J.D. Harvard University. I thank the support
of the James E. Rogers Research Grant Foundation. Many thanks also to Christopher L. Blakesley, Lynne Henderson, Joan W. Howarth, Mary LaFrance, Victor C.
Romero, and Carl Tobias for helpful comments to the manuscript. I especially
thank A. Christopher Bryant for the generous exchange of ideas and information,
and for his insightful comments to the manuscript. I am also indebted to Raquel
Lazo and Mariteresa Rivera-Rogers for their excellent research and technical assistance, and to the OREGONLAWREVIEWeditors for the editorial process. Finally, I
thank my colleague and loving husband Ngai Pindell for his constant faith in my
abilities and his comforting patience. All errors that remain are mine.
1 Days after the attacks, Congress enacted a Joint Resolution authorizing the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) [hereinafter September 18 Joint
Resolution].
2 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, S/RES/1368 (2001).
3 George W. Bush, President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts ,
Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 11, 2002), available .at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020311-1.h tml.
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and their supporters, by seeking to capture and prosecute them. 4
These two responses resulted in the mostly-secret detentions of
hundreds captured abroad or arreste d in the United States.
These detention practices have become the subject of litigation in
U.S. courts. 5 This Article examines the courts' "mixed" responses6 in the recent litigation, and proposes three princip les
that guide, or should guide, judges' decision-making in cases that
implicate national security concerns.
In Afghanistan and other countries, the U.S. military captured
severa l hundred foreign nationals as "enemy combatants," 7 de4 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Office of the Press Secretary (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/cnn/docs/gwbush/bushspeeech20010920.html. See also U.S. Department of Jus-

tice Office of the Inspector General, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, 10-16 (June 2003) [hereinafter OIG Report],
available at http://www.usdoj .gov/oig/special/03-06/index.htm.
5 My research yielded eleven lawsuits challenging various aspects of the U.S. detention practices: Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y
2002) and Hamdi v. Rumsfe ld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (filing "next friend"
habeas corpus petitions on behalf of "enemy combatants" in U.S. prisons); Coalition
of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003);
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odoh v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (filing "next friend" habeas corpus petitions
on behalf of all or a few of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay); In re the Application
of the United States for a Materia l Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) and United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (filing
motions to invalidate material witness warrants or suppress the grand jury testimony
of a material witness); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)
and N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (filing motions to enjoin closed immigration hearings);
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Civ. No.
02-() (E.D.N.Y. Apr . 17, 2002) (challe~ging the indefinite detention of persons ordered deported from the United States) [hereinafter Turkmen, Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/terror
ism/turkmenash41702cmp.pdf; Haddad v. Ashcroft, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Civ. No. 02-70605 (E.D. MI Sept. 17, 2002) (filing
motion for different immigration judge and new public bond hearing); Ctr. for Nat'!
Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (filing motion to
compel FOIA request for information about the detainees); Am. Civil Liberties
Union of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 174 (2002) (filing motion to compel Right-to-Know
Law request for information about INS detainees); and American-Arabs Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Ashcroft, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (seeking
to enjoin the INS detention practices of non-immigrants of mostly Arab nations who
are required to register with the INS).
6 By "mixed," I mean that the outcomes in some cases favored the executive and
in others the petitioners. See infra Part I.
7 The term "enemy combatant" is not a term of art under international humanita rian law. Rather, the President appears to have expropriated the word from Ex
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taining th em in Afghanistan or in Guantanamo Bay. 8 The military also captured in Afghanistan at least one U.S. citizen,
detaining him in a U.S. military prison. 9 Inside the United
States, federal law enforcement, in conjunction with state and local agencies, launched a sweeping investigation into the terrorist
attacks and other terrorist threats against U.S. citizens and U.S.
interests. As part of this domestic so-called war on terrori sm, the
executive detained at least several hundred individuals for either
alleged violations of various criminal or immigration laws, or as
material witnesses believed to possess information relevant to
terrorist activities. 10 Moreover, at least one U.S. citizen and a
Qatari national who were arrested in the United States are being
held in military custody as "enemy combatants." 11
The executive has relied on federal criminal statutes to arrest
some of the detainees, although most have been charged with
crimes unrelated to terrorism. 12 As this Article goes to publicaparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment
of Enemy Combatant, Preliminary Report (Aug. 8, 2002) at 7-8 [hereinafter ABA
Preliminary Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy_combat

ants.pdf.
8 See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
9 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 450. See also infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances of Hamdi's capture). The military did not treat John Walker
Lindh, also a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan, as an "enemy combatant." On
July 15, 2002, he pied guilty to supplying services to the Taliban. As part of his plea,
he agreed to cooperate with investigators. He will serve twenty years in prison.
Timeline, DETROITNEws, Sept. 11, 2001, at 02S.
10 Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep' t of Justice, Declaration of James Reynolds, No. 01-2500 (U.S. D.C. District Court) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ctr.
for Nat 'l Sec. Studies, Declaration]. See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN.L.
REV. 953, 960 (2002) (discussing the executive's secret detention practices after the
September 11 attacks).
11 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
executive arrested U.S. citizen Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah Al Muhajir, in Chicago
on May 8, 2002, pursuant to a material witness warrant related to grand jury proceedings. Id . at 569. On June 9, 2002, the President determined that Padilla was an
"enemy combatant" and should be transferred to military custody. Id. at 571-72.
The executive believes Padilla was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive "dirty bomb." Id. at 572-73. In June 2003, President Bush designated Ali S.
Marri , a Qatari man, who arrived in the United States the day before the September
11 attacks, an "enemy combatant." Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush
Designates Qatari Man as an Enemy Combatant, WASH. Pos T, June 29, 2003, at A3.
Federal prosecutors accused Marri of being part of an al Qaeda sleeper cell. Id.
12 According to the most recent information released by the Department of Justice, 134 individuals have been detained on federal criminal charges in the postSeptember 11 investigation; ninety-nine have been found guilty either through pleas
or trials. Many of the crimes bear no relation to terrorism. Ctr . for Nat'! Security
Studies v. U.S . Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921 (D .C. Cir. 2003). See also http://
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tion , the execut ive has charged or linked five individuals with
crimes related directly to September 11 or with other attempted
acts of terrorism. 13 In addition, the executive has indicted approximately twenty-three individuals for their "association" with
al Qaeda or the Taliban. 14 To detain materia l witnesses, the executive has relied on the 1984 "material witness statute." 15 As to
news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index.html (listing some of the criminal and civil "terror" cases since September 11).
13 These men are: Zacarias Moussaou i (the alleged "20th hijacker"), Richard Reid
(the airline "shoe bomber"), Mohamed Abdoula (the Yemeni college student accused of arranging flight lessons for two of the hijackers) and Iman Faris (the Ohio
truck driver accused of plott ing to bomb a New York bridge). Special Coverage: War
on Terrorism, at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/terrorism/usmouss71602spind.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2002); http://news.find law.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism /usreid1223
Olcmp.pdf; http://news.find law.com/ legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index2.html#
abdoulah; and http://news.findlaw.com/ndocs/Faris/USFaris603scf.pdf. The government of Pakistan also handed over to the United States Ramzi bin al-Shibh, believed
to be a high-profile suspect in the planning of the September 11 attacks. David
Johnston & David Rohde, Terrorism Suspect Taken to U.S. Base for Interrogation,
N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 17, 2002, at Al.
14 In addition to John Philip Walker Lindh, supra note 9, the executive indicted
four men with operating a sleeper al Qaeda cell in Detroit. Two of the defendants
were found guilty of the charges, a third was acquitted of the terror-related charges
but found guilty of conspiracy related to document fraud, and a fourth was aquitted
of all charges. Danny Hak im, Man Aquitted in Terror Case Says Co-Defendents Will
Be Cleared, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2003, at Al5. The executive also charged a Seatt le
man, James Ujaama, with conspiring to aid al Qaeda by attempting to establish a
terrorist training camp in Oregon. Allan Lengel, Skepticism of Detroit's Arab Americans Grows Some Doubt: Charges Against 4 Accused of Operating Terror Cell,
Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2002, at A3. In addition, the executive charged six men residing in Buffalo, New York of providing "material support" to terrorists by receiving
training at an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. Four of these defendants have plead
guilty and in exchange for a lesser sentence have agreed to cooperate with the terror
investigation. Associated Press, Fourth New York Terror Suspect Pleads Guilty
(Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.miami.com/mid/miamiherald/news/nation/55
93534.htm. The executive similarly charged six people from Portland, Oregon with
conspiring to join al Qaeda and the Taliban regime to wage war on U.S. forces in
Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks. U.S. Charges Six with Conspiracy:
Group Allegedly Tried to Join Al Qaeda, WASH.PosT, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al. Finally,
the executive indicted approximately nine members of organizations alleged to be a
financial front for terrorism. United States v. Sattar , Indictment, No. 02 Cr. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/terrorism/ussattar0409
02ind.pdf (case against four members of the Islamic group); United States v.
Arnaout , Indictment, No. 02 Cr. 892 (N.D. 11.2003), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usarnaout10902ind.pdf (case against Director of the Benevolence International Foundation); and Timothy L. O'Brien, Federal Indictment
Charges 8 with Operating Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 10, 2003, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/02/2D/national/20CND-INDICT.html?ex =1062907200&en=
3066280f65025460&ei=5070(discussing the arrest in Florida and Illinois of member s
of the Islamic group).
15 18 u.s.c. § 3144 (1984).

The 9/11 "National Security" Cases

989

the immigration detainees in pro longed detention, the executive
appears to rely on a September 20, 2001, INS regulation that allowed the former INS to detain individuals without charge for
forty-eight hours or for "an additional reasonable period of
time" in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.16 Finally, the military has relied on President Bush's
Military Order of November 13, 2001, 17 and subsequent military
orders, 18 to detain non-U.S. citizens in Afghanistan or in Guantanamo Bay, as well as U.S. citizens in U.S. military bases, as
"enemy combatants." The executive has also cited statutory authority to execute the military detentions. 19
16 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2003). The executive's reliance on this provision has been
challenged by advocates of immigration detainees because their clients are being
held for prolonged periods of time rather than ordered deported, apparently in the
hope that their detention will produce leads in the anti-terrorist investigation. See
Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences
of Racial Profiling After S<;ptember11, 34 CoNN. L. REV. 1185, 1189-90 (2002);
Turkmen, Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury nial, supra note 5. Interestingly, the executive has not relied on provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that
grant the attorney general the power to detain for up to seven days non-U.S. citizens
whom the attorney general has "reasonable grounds" to believe fall within the expansive immigration anti-terrorist provisions. Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act two months following the
attack, responding, in part, to extraordinary political pressure from the executive.
See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.Q. 373 (2002) (discussing the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (ATA), the Bush
administration's proposed legislation introduced to Congress just over a week after
September 11). Yet, because the USA PATRIOT Act did not grant the executive
the expansive immigration powers it sought, the executive has circumvented Congress' effort to impose a seven day limit by not certifying any of the detainees as a
terrorist suspect. See id. at 386-91 (discussing the legislative history of the USA
PATRIOT Act pertaining to Congress' refusal to grant the executive's request for
more expansive immigration detention powers). See also Ashar, supra at 1190 (explaining that the INS has not certified any detainee as a terrorist suspect to circumvent the USA PATRIOT Act); OIG Report, supra note 4, at 32-71 (describing the
attorney general's reliance on the regulation, rather than statutory guidelines, for
immigration detentions and the delays in processing these detainees).
17 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter November 13 Military
Order].
18 On June 9, 2002, for example, President George W. Bush issued an order to the
Secretary of Defense setting forth the President's conclusion that Padilla is an "enemy combatant." Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572-73
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). In summary, the basis for that conclusion included that Padilla is
"closely associated with al Qaeda," engaged in "hostile and war-like acts" including
"preparation for acts of international terrorism" and possesses information that
would be helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks. Id.
19 The President cites three sources of authority : his powers as commander in
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The executive has largely acted with the utmost secrecy in
treating these detainees. Except for partial information it has
disclosed because of pressure from lawsuits 20 and Congress,21 the
executive has refused to reveal the identity , national origin, place
of detention, and reason for detention of most persons who are
held either as immigration detainees, as material witnesses, or for
violating federal crimes. 22 Among this group, the executive has
ordered hundreds removed from the United States in secret immigration hearings. 23 The executive has also treated those dechief, Congress' September 18 Joint Resolution, and 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836. RICHARDH. FALLON,ET. AL,THE FEDERALCOURTSANDTHEFEDERALSYSTEM52 (4th
ed. 1996 and Supp. 2001). But see infra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing
challenges to the President's claim to statutory authority).
20 Several civil rights groups filed two lawsuits to compel the executive to release
certain information about the detainees under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) or the New Jersey Right-to-Know Law. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Am. Civil Liberties Union of
N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
21 See 147 CoNG. REc. S13923 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
22 Ctr. for Nat'/ Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 918. On January 11, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft released two lists with partial information (on file with author). One
of the lists contained the detainees' names, dates of detention or release, the names
of the lawyers, and the criminal charges against ninety-two individuals. The criminal
charges overwhelmingly dealt with using forged documents to commit financial
fraud, falsifying identification and immigration documents, and other immigration
crimes (e.g., refusing to leave after having been ordered deported, re-entering the
country illegally, and harboring undocumented immigrants). Three individuals were
charged with murder, weapon trafficking, bringing firearms and explosives into an
aircraft, or pirating an aircraft. Zacarias Moussaoui appears on this list. The second
list provided the nationality, date of detention, and the immigration charges against
725 individuals. The list blacked out, however, the detainees' names, where they
were being detained, and, if represented by counsel, the names of their lawyers.
These two lists did not contain any information about those being detained as material witnesses. In addition, Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to receive and review claims of civil rights and
civil liberties violations by department employees. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note
16. In April 2003, the OIG issued its first report, which was critical of the executive's treatment of immigration detainees . OIG Report, supra note 4. The OIG
Report focused solely on the treatment of immigration detainees held in New York
and New Jersey, including the charging process, the no~bond policy, and the removal
and conditions of detention. Id. OIG Report mostly analyzed the flaws in the procedures from detention to removal or release, but it also disclosed some specifics on
the actual practices, including demographics and length of detention. Id. at 20-21,
30, 105.
23 Professor Cole cites that the executive has ordered removed from the United
States over 700 non -U.S. citizens in such secret immigration hearings. Cole, supra
note 10, at 961-62; see also Tamara Audi, U.S. Held 600 for Secret Rulings: immigrants Jailed for Terrorism Investigators, DETROITFREE PRESS,July 18, 2002, available at http://www.freep.com/news/mich/secret18_20020718.htm. These numbers are
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tained as material witnesses as high-security inmates, denying
them access to visitors, including their family and lawyers. 24 Similarly, the executive has barred the Guantanamo Bay detainees
from talking with counsel or with their family members. 25 Moreover, the executive has denied two U.S. citizens and one foreign
national, who are being held in military detention as "enemy
combatants" inside the United States, access to all visitors, including attorneys seeking to represent them. 26 The executive has
paradoxically provided more information ( and greater rights) to
likely to be much higher in light of the mass detentions that followed when certain
non-immigrant, mostly Arab males reported to the former INS to register as required by regulation. Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67
Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 CF). On November 6, 2002, the former INS ordered all male nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan,
and Syria born on or before November 15, 1986, who were inspected and last admitted to the United States on or before September 10, 2002, and who plan to remain in
the United States at least until December 16, 2002, to register before an immigration
officer by December 16, 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002). A Department of
Justice spokesperson has reported to the media that about 400 people who showed
up to register in Southern California alone were detained, allegedly for visa
problems. David Rosenzweig, Three Groups Sue Over Arrests of Arab Men: They
Seek an Injunction to Prevent Widespread Government Detentions of People Showing
up to Register with the INS, as Happened Last Week, L.A. TIMES,Dec. 25, 2002, at
B3. Similar detentions have been reported in other cities, although in fewer numbers. See, e.g., Barry Witt, Six-day Ordeal for Immigrants: 13 from Bay Area Comply with New Security Program are Detained, SAN JosE MERCURYNEws, Dec. 26,
2002, at 3B. Since then, the former INS issued three additional orders with respect
to several other nationalities. 67 Fed. Reg. 70,525 (Nov. 22, 2002) (requiring nationals of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea,
Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen to appear for
special registration); 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642 (Dec. 18, 2002) (requiring nationals of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait to appear for special registration);
and AG Order 2643-2000 (Jan. 16, 2003) (requiring nationals of Bangladesh, Egypt,
Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait to appear for special registration).
24 See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Material witnesses have a statutory right to appointed counsel. In re Class Action
Application of All Material Witnesses in W. Dist. of Tex., 612 F. Supp. 940, 943
(W.D. Tex. 1985). However, restricted phone use and location transfers have impeded their contact with counsel. See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 82. See also
Steve Fairaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo:
Nearly Half Held in War on Terror Haven't Testified, WASH.PosT, Nov. 24, 2002, at
Al (reporting that at least forty-four people arrested as material witnesses, seven of
whom were U.S. citizens, have been held under maximum security conditions, ranging from a few days to several months or longer, with only twenty having been
brought before a grand jury).
25 See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
26 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002); Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 565, 573-74 (S.D;N.Y. 2002); Susan Schmidt, Qatari Man Designated an Enemy Combatant, WASH.PosT, June 24, 2003, at Al.
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those charged with serious terrorist-re lated offenses. 27
The executive has similarly relied on statutes, or has acted
without congressional authorization, to refuse the public information about the detainees, or access to them. The Department
of Justice has cited severa l Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) 28 provisions that exempt the government from having to
disclose information about law enforcement practices, if doing so
would interfere with the investigation, invade personal privacy,
or endanger the safety of an individua l.29 The military has refused any access to "en~my combatants" by relying on the November 13 Military Order. This order, as well as subseq uent
military orders, authorize trial by military commission, without
judicial review, of non-U.S. citizens (and apparently citizens)3°
whom the government suspects of international terrorism. 31 To
refuse public access to the immigration hearings of "special interest" cases, the executive has relied on a directive issued by Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy on September 21, 2001.32
This directive calls on all immigration judges and court administrators to "close ['special interest'] hearings to the public, and to
avoid discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any information
about the case to anyone outside the Immigration Court. "33
In some of the lawsuits, petitioners request that the courts curtail the executive's secret detention practices by declaring that
federa l agencies have exceeded the scope of their authority
under existing statutes and violated their rights, 34 or have acted
27 ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing U.S. treatment of
John Walker Lindh, Zacarias Moussaoui, and Richard Reid). Lately, the executive
has been considering abandoning the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui in federal
court and trying him before a military commission, citing that Moussaoui's request
to access witnesses and evidence has created insurmountab le legal impediments to
his prosecution. Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: The 9-11
Suspect, White House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try Moussaoui, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 1 at 17.
28 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
29 Ctr. for Nat'/ Sec. Studies, Declaration, supra note 10, 'l[ 12 (citing exemptions
7(A), 7(C) and 7(F) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)) .
30 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 265 for definition of "enemy combatant" under the November 13
Military Order.
32 Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to all immigration judges and court administrators for cases requiring special procedures (Sept. 21,
2001) (on file with author).
33 Id. The directive does not explain the standards for deciding which cases are
subject to secret proceedings.
34 In re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213
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without congressional authorization to do so.35 Other lawsuits
challenge the executive's secret practices by alleging that these
violate the public's right to know what "their government is up
to" 36 under the FOIA and the First Amendment. 37 The executive, for its part, has denied exceeding its statutory authority
when congressional authorization exists.38 In the absence of congressional authorization (or if courts find none), the executive
has also claimed inherent powers to act unilaterally und er the
President's power as commander in chief, 39 or pursuant to the
F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (seeking the courts to hold that 18 U.S.C § 3144 does not authorize
material witness warrants for grand jury testimony and that a different reading
would violate the 4th Amendment); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (alleging that Padilla's confinement violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) and the USA PATRIOT Act); Turkmen, Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 5 (alleging that the INS practice of retaining in
custody those ordered removed or who agreed to voluntary departure for purposes
of a criminal investigation violate 8 U.S.C. § ·1231(a)(l) (ninety-day removal period)
and 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2) (120-day period for voluntary departure) and, inter alia,
the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendm ents).
35 Rasul v. Bush, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2002) (alleging that the November 13 Military Order violates, inter alia, the War Powers
Clause and the 5th and 14th Amendments), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/terrorism/rasulbush021902pet.pdf; Padilla v. Bush, Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Civ. No. 02-4445 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2002) (alleging that
President Bush's Order declaring Jose Padilla an "enemy combatant" and directing
Donald Rumsfeld to detain him indefinite ly for interrogation without access to
counsel or the courts violates the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments and Article I (Suspension of the Writ) of the United States Constit ution) , available at http://news.find
law.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padilla bush61902apet. pdf.
36 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
37 Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (alleging that the DOJ's refusal to disclose the information requested violated
the FOIA and the First Amendment); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)
(alleging that Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy's order to close "special interest" immigration hearings violates the First Amendment).
38 Ctr. for Nat' l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Civ. No. 01-2500, at 2-3 (on file with
author) (arguing that the executive's non-disclosure of the information requested is
consistent with the FOIA) ; Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 62 ("The prosecution ,
however, claims that its power to deta in material witnesses in connection with a
grand jury investigation is authorized by section 3144... .").
39 Padilla v. Bush, Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Civ. No. 02-4445, at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y . June 26, 2002) (arguing that Padilla's
detention as an "enemy combatant" is consistent with the laws of war during an
ongoing armed conflict), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/pa dillabush62602gmot.pdf; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Respondents' Motion to Stay Magistrate Judge's May 20, 2002 Order Regarding Access and Memorandum in Support ,
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"governmen t's plenary power over immigration." 40 The government's pleadings also admonish the courts not to intervene improperly into the actions of the executive when it is acting in a
time of urgent need to protect national security. 41
These cases impose two difficult tasks on the judiciary. First,
they require judges to consider the appropriate balance between
competing interests of secrecy and openness on issues of national
security, as well as between flexible law enforcement practices
for collective security and the rights of individuals affected by
such practices. Second, judges must also consider the judi ciary's
appropriate scope of review regarding the executive's response
to threats to national security. This issue is of particular relevance when the execut ive purports to secret ly detain, question,
deport, or even prosecute either in excess of-or without-con gressional authorization, and without judici al review. 42
In the past, judicial deference has broadly insulated the executive from accountability in matters of national security , at least
Civ. No. 2:02CV348 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2002) (arguing that the President ordered
Hamdi's detention as commander in chief in the context of ongoing combat operations against the al Qaeda terrorist network and remain ing members of the Taliban
in Afghanistan), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirum52
302gmot.pdf; Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.C.C. 2002) (describing the
executive's characterization of Guantanamo Bay detainees as "people who are
seized during the course of combative activities," and that, therefore, "the scope of
[their] rights are for the military and political branches to determine . . . .")
40 Detroit Free Press , 303 F.3d at 685 ( defending Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy's directive to close all special interest immigration hearings by arguing that
the executive's power over immigration is plenary).
41 Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., Government's Reply in Support of
Application for a Stay Pending Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, Civ. No. A-99, at 3 (S. Ct. June 2002) (arguing, inter alia, that the
district court's order to open immigration hearings to the public is "a drastic incursion into the responsibilities of the Branch of the Government respons ible for pro tecting the national security"), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ter
rorism/ ashnj mg602grpIysty.pdf.
42 The judiciary also faces equally difficult questions when the executive acts with
statutory authorization to infringe on civil liberties in the name of national security.
See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding the Espionage Act
convictions during WWI); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Japanese internment during WWII). The USA PATRIOT Act has similarly
raised significant concerns among civil liber ty groups. See Ronald Weich, Upsetting
Checks and Balances: Congressional Hostility Toward the Courts in Times of Crisis,
ACLU, at http ://www.aclu.org/Nat ionalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9810&c =
lll&Typ e=s (Nov. 1, 2001). It is likely that this law will also be challenged in court.
This Article, however, focuses only on those cases that challenge the executive's
detention practices since September 11, due in substantial part to the executive's
lack or abuse of congressional authority.
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when Congress has remained silent , but also when deferring to
the executive's expansive interpretation of statutes. 43 In fact, although many challenge the constitutional propriety of such decisions,44 in at least some cases the U.S. Supreme Court has
strongly suggested that the executive enjoys a degree of constitutionally-based discretion to act in matters of national security. 45
There are also, however, important historical examples when
judges have called into question the executive's claims to inher ent national security powers; 46or, at a minimum, have curbed the
executive's discretion by refusing judicial remedies 47 or by reviewing its actions. 48 This varied judicial precedent on national
security cases has resulted in some ambiguity about whether
there are inherent executive national security powers, and, if so,
what are their nature and scope. 49
At first glance, the degree of judicial deference paid to the executive in the post-September 11 litigation can also be characterized as "mixed." Courts generally have demonstrated greater
willingness to defer to the executive on matters that implicate the
treatment of "enemy combatants." However, some courts have
43See, e.g., HAROLDHoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONALSECURITYCONSTITUTION:
SHARINGPowER AITER THE IRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR (1990); Harold Edgar &
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National
Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1986); James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War: The Role of Congress, 34 B.C. L. REv. 451
(1993); Matthew N. Kaplan, Who Will Guard the Guardians? Independent Counsel,
State Secrets, and Judicial Review, 18 Nov A L. REv. 1787 (1994); Henry P.
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1993).
44Many constitutiona l scholars have concluded that the founders intended national security to be a shared power among the three branches of government, subject to the system of institutional checks and balances. See, e.g. , Ko H, supra note 43,
at 69.
45See, e.g. , Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); Chicago & S. Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. CurtisWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
46See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that while the United States civil
courts were still functioning, the president could not declare martial law).
47United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing an injunction to
enjoin the press from publishing government documents on the Vietnam War).
48See, e.g., Steven J. Bucklin, To Preserve These Rights: The Constitution and
National Emergencies, 47 S.D. L. REv. 85, 88-89 (2002). President Lincoln's biggest
problem when he attempted to enforce the Enrollmen t Act of 1863, the nation's first
draft, came from state and federal judges who issued writs to individuals seeking to
avoid military service. Id.
49See Roy E . Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. &
PoL. 1, 8 (2000).
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been more willing to restrict the executive's discretion in regard
to detainees with more attenuated connections to terrorism.
This Article attempts to clarify some of the ambiguity that has
resulted from the different outcomes to date in the post -Septem ber 11 litigation. Specifically, this Article examines important
factual and legal distinctions in the national security cases that
have ( or should have) influenced the courts' determination of the
nature and scope of inherent executive powers in matters of national security. These distinctions reflect the inherent tension in
the judiciary 's attempt to balance the executive's pragmatic need
to act expeditiously and decisively in times of national crisis
against the constitutiona l· requirements of institutional checks
and balances, which include the judiciary 's role of protecting individual rights.
Three factual or legal distinctions have (or should have)
guided the outcomes in the post-September 11 litigation. First,
the extent to which courts have considered the executive's actions to implicate greater concerns with national security than
domestic affairs has influenced the scope of the judicial deference granted to the executive. This national security/domestic affairs dichotomy, which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in
Curtiss-Wright 50 and implicitly affirmed in Youngstown ,51 remains "goo d law." 52 This precedent holds that the executive's
nationa l security inherent powers are correspondingly greater to
the extent that its actions affect national security affairs ( CurtissWright ), and correspondingly less to the extent that its actions
affect domestic affairs (Youngstown ). 53 Thus, when deciding
cases in which the president claims inherent national security
powers, courts must first attempt the difficult determination of
whether the President's acts have a greater effect on nationa l security-Le., war powers 54 -than they do on domestic affairs.55
so United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) ("That
there are differences between [external and internal affairs], and that these differences are fundamental, may not be doubted.").
51 Brownell, supra note 49, at 49-53 (discussing the several times Justice Jackson
referred in his Youngstown concurrence to the difference between national security
and domestic powers).
52 See infra Part II.A.
53 Id .
54 National security refers to both war and foreign affairs powers. KoH, supra
note 43, at 262 n.23. The term was not officially coined until the cold war when
Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947. Id. at 74. The only quasiofficial definition of the term was prepared for a dictionary used by the joint chiefs
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The cases arising since September 11 are no exception . The relevance of the national security/domestic affairs dichotomy has
arisen principally with respect to the executive's so-called domestic war on terrorism. This becomes evident, at least in some
cases, when contrasting the judiciary's degree of deference to the
executive in cases that involve those detained as "enemy combatants" with the degree of deference in cases concerning other detainees. This "mixed" judicial response to the executive reflects
some courts' justified skepticism that, unlike the arrest of persons
more directly linked to the Taliban regime or al Qaeda, the executive's sweeping detention practices in the United States could
constitute national security affairs.
Second, in the past courts have not deferred to the executive,
even in cases that implicate national security, when the executive
is exercising a power the Constitution reserves for Congress. In
the post-September 11 litigation, this issue has arisen regarding
the executive's decision to preclude or limit those detained as
"enemy combatants" from pursuing habeas petitions, and to proscribe federal court jurisdiction over the military tribunals. 56 To
date, most courts have either foreclosed the detainees' practical
ability (even if not their legal right) to access the courts by permitting the executive to erect "barriers" that preclude their opportunities for any judi cial review or have significantly limited
the scope of judicial review by prescribing standards deferential
to the executive. 57 To do so, courts have deferred to the executive's claims of inherent national security powers and/or to statutory authority to deny petitioners jurisdiction or to grant the
executive broad powers. 58 In doing so, courts have dismissed or
overlooked significant separation of powers concerns in their
holdings, at least when ju dicial review has been completely preof staff, which read "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or
group of nations, or ... a favorable foreign relations position, or ... a defense
posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or
without, overt or covert." Id. at 262 n.23 (citing Richard Barnet, Rethinking Na tional Strategy, New YoRKER, Mar. 21, 1988, at 107). Thus, although Curtiss-Wright
distinguished between external and internal affairs, national security may refer to
government acts inside the United States, so long as these are related to war powers
·
or foreign affairs.
55 Brownell, supra note 49, at 103; Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 43, at 352.
56 See infra Part II.B.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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eluded or significantly obstructed. 59
Finally, in some post-September 11 cases, courts have heeded
the petitioners' Bill of Rights challenges, particu larly those seeking to curtail the executive's secret practices. Yet, in the past,
courts have not always denied the executive's inherent powers in
national affairs, even when its actions have resulted in violations
of the Bill of Rights. 60 Instead, courts have simply ignored important Bill of Rights considerations and deferred to the executive's exercise of national security powers, 61 although this
deference has not been universal. 62 Based on this, at first glance,
case law precedents appear inconsistent. However, there are
general principles that reconcile, in part, these different results.
First, sometimes courts draw an important distinction between
substantive and procedural individual rights, when deferring to
the political branches on political questions, including those pertaining to national security. 63 In the post-September 11 cases,
courts have drawn this distinction principally as to the executive's plenary powers in immigration law.64 Second, courts have
59

Id .

Brownell, supra note 49, at 88-92 (explaining that while some federal court
cases espouse the view that when individual rights are implicated in matters of national affairs the more balanced Youngstown review applies, this view is not consistent with some important U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
61 Id. at 91 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U .S. 654 (1981),
in which the Court ignored the Fifth Amendment taking issues in favor of inherent
executive powers in foreign affairs).
62 Id. at 89 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (involving the right to
travel), and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (involving the First
Amendment right against prior restraint)).
63 See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Decided the same day as Kore matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld the executive's right to detain Endo, but only until it determined her lack of loyalty. Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. at 302. Unfortunately, the Court did not order Endo's release until
two and one-half years after her initial petition for writ, and one day after the internment order had been revoked . Bucklin, supra note 48, at 93.
64 In the post-September 11 litigation, the Eastern District Court of Michigan distinguished between substantive and procedural rights when it held that Rabih Haddad had a due process right to an open immigration bond hearing. Haddad v.
Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (granting plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction). The distinction also came up in the Sixth Circuit decision to
order the opening of immigration hearings to the public. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 687-93 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit distinguished Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the
public could not assert a First ,Amendment right to alter substantive immigration
policy (i.e., declaring the exclusion of "communist" unconstitutional). Detroit Free
Press, 303 F.3d at 687. To do so, the Sixth Circuit held that an order to open up the
60
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sometimes enjoined the executive from keeping government
secrets in order to safeguard the public's right to know what
"their government is up to." 65 Courts, however, have generally
granted the executive wide discretion to keep secrets where the
executive asserts that the information sought constitutes national
security secrets. 66 Yet, even when the executive asserts a national security interest, courts have sometimes limited executive
discretion when judges perceive a countervailing public interest
to hold the executive accountable to the rule of law.67 In the
post -September 11 litigation context, courts' "mixed" degrees of
deference to the executive's refusal to release the requested information about the detainees, or to open immigration hearings
to the public, has largely depended on whether the courts perceived the executive's law and immigration enforcement practices as necessary to protect national security. 68
In Part I, this Article discusses the opinions issued to date in
the post-September 11 litigation cases that pertain to detainees.
Part II examines these opinions in light of the three suggested
principles that have guided (or should have guided) the courts'
rulings in these cases. None of the opinions discussed are final,
and some are being considered on appeal at the time of this Article's publication. Some cases may reach the Supreme Court and
even be reversed. However, many of the issue~ confronted by
the courts will remain, and the principles suggested in this Article
will ( or should) continue to guide judges' decision-making.
I

· To date , the federal courts' degree of deference to the executive's so-called war on terrorism can be characterized as "mixed."
The executive's clearer victories pertain to its treatment of those
deemed "enemy combatants. "69 Courts are split on whether the
executive's detention and treatme nt of material witnesses is conimmigration hearings altered only a procedural immigration law since the public
could not alter the outcome of the hearing. Id. at 687-93. Because these distinctions
are made principally as to the executive's plenary powers in immigration, not national security, they are not examined in this Article.
65 U .S. Dep't of Justice v. Report ers Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U .S. 749,
773 (1989).
66 See infra Part II.C.
Id.
See infra Parts LC and II.C.
69 See infra Part I.A.
67
68
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sistent with statutory authority. 7 ° Finally, courts have imposed
different degrees of judicial oversight on the executive's refusal
of information to the public about the detainees, or access to immigration hearings. Courts have either fully accepted the executive's request for secrecy, or have compelled the government to
provide access or information to the public by subjecting the executive's unsubstantiated or blanket assertions about the need
for secrecy to stricter judicial review. 71

A.

"Enemy Combatants"

The courts' rulings on the habeas corpus petitions filed on be half of those detained as "enemy combatants" have been quite
favorable to the executive. The executive's first victories have
been in the treatment of Hamdi and Padilla, the two U.S. citizens
held in military detention as "enemy combatants," despite some
setbacks in Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush .12
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed and
remanded a district court's June 11 order that Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and detained in a U.S. military
prison, "must be allowed to meet with his attorney because of
fundamental justice provided in the Constitution." 73 The military denied Hamdi access to a public defender that Hamdi 's father retained to represent him, alleging that such access would
compromise the government's anti-terrorism investigation. 74 In
See infra Part LB.
infra Part LC.
72 See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
70

71 See

73 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). Hamdi first surrendered
to the Northern Alliance forces that were acting in conjunction with American
forces in Afghanistan, although the circumstances of his surrender and detention are
unclear. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Order Directing Government to Provide More Infor mation, Civ. No. 2:02cv439,at 2-3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Hamdi, Aug.
16 Order], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums81602
ord.pdf.
74 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282. Specifically, the executi.ve alleged that "[t]he moment
that counsel is inserted between captured, hostile combatants and military authorities engaged in intelligence gathering, the relationship of trust and dependency between detainees and the military that is key to such intelligence-gathering efforts
may be destroyed, and critical life-saving intelligence may be lost." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay Pending Consideration of Motion for
Stay Pending Appeal , Civ. No. 2:02cv439, at 3 (4th Cir. June 13, 2002), available at
http://news .findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums61302estay.pdf . Moreover,
the executive alleged that "members of the al Qaeda network and its supporters are
trained to pass concealed messages through unwitting intermediaries such as attorneys." Id.
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reversing the order, the Fourth Circuit criticized the district court
for not considering what effect petitioner's unmonitored access
to counsel might have upon the executive's ongoing gathering of
intelligence. 75 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit did not mention the
need to balance any effect of Hamdi's incommunicado detention
on his rights to judicial review. Upon remand to the district
court, the Fourth Circuit exhorted the district court to defer to
the executive on the military designation and treatment of "enemy combatants." In doing so, the Fourth Circuit offered two
distinct rationales. First, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
President enacted the November 13 Military Order pursuant to
his inherent powers in matters of national security. 76 Second, the
Fourth Circuit stated, without citing a specific statute, that Congress authorized these military detentions. 77
On remand, with further instructions from the Fourth Circuit ,
the district court considered solely the question of whether a
two-page declaration from Michael H. Mobbs (Mobbs Declaration), a Defense Department special adviser, standing alone, was
sufficient justification for a person born in the United States to
be considered an "enemy combatant." 78 The district court understood the consequences of allowing the executive's determination of Hamdi's status as an "enemy combatant" to also mean
judicial deference to the execut ive's incommunicado detention of
Hamdi to date. 79 Perhaps because the district court treated these
75
76

Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282.
Id. at 281 ("The order arises in the context of foreign relations and national

security, where a court's deference to the political branches of our national government is considerable. It is the President who wields 'delicate, plenary and exclusive
power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations-a power that does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.'") (quoting and citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S
304, 320 (1936)). The panel also cites to Ex part~ Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942), for
the proposition that "the Court stated in no uncertain terms that the President's
wartime detention decision are to be accorded great deference from the courts."
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282. In citing Ex parte Quirin, the panel does not acknowledge
the case's more fact-bound reading of approving such tribunals only when predicated on congressional authorization. See FALLON,supra note 19, at 49. See also
infra note 260-62 and accompanying text.
77 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281 ("And where as here the President does act with statutory authorization from Congress, there is all the more reason for deference.") (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 & n.2 (1952)).
But see infra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to the President's claim to statutory authority).
78 Hamdi, Aug. 16 Order, supra note 73, at 4-5, 8.
79 The district court framed the question to be decided as follows: "[T]he sole
purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the Mobbs Declaration, standing
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two issues as related, it resolved that, even if the court must ultimately defer to the executive's classification of "enemy combat ants," its evaluation of the executive's process for classifying
Hamdi an "enemy c.ombatant" must allow for a meaningful judi cial review to protect Hamdi's due process rights under the Con stitution. 80 To do so, the district court developed a standard of
judicial review that examined both the executive's procedures for
determining Hamdi's status and the constitutionality of the executive's treatment of Hamdi to date. 81 The district court then held
that the Mobbs Declaration fell short of even these minimal criteria of judicial review. 82 Specifically, the district court found
that the Declaration failed to address Mobbs' authority to make
declarations about Hamdi's classification and to specify the pro cedures Mobbs employed for such a review and, therefore, was
insufficient to determine whether Hamdi's classification violated
the Fifth Amendment. 83 The .district court considered, moreover,
that were it to accept the Mobbs Declaration as sufficient evidence to decide Hamdi's fate, it would be acting as little more
than a rubber-stamp. 84 Therefore, the district court ordered the
government to turn over, among other things, copies of Hamdi's
statements, the · names and addresses of all interrogators who
questioned Hamdi, and statements by members of the Northern
Alliance regarding Hamdi's capture. 85
On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit once again reversed the
district court and held that the Mobbs Declaration was a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the commander in chief
alone, was sufficient justification for a person born in the United States to be held
without charges , incommunicado, in solitary confinement, and without access to
counsel on U.S. soil." Id . at 5.
80 Id. at 8.
81 Specifically, the court developed a judicial standard of review that, at minimum,
should determine whether the military's classification of Hamdi was determined
pursuant to appropriate authority; whether the screening criteria used to make and
maintain his classification was consistent with Fifth Amendment due process requirements; on what basis the government had determined that Hamdi's continued
detention without charges and without access to counsel serves national security;
and whether the Geneva Treaty or the Joint Services Regulations required a different process. Id. at 9.
82
83

Id .
Id. at 9-11. Throughout the Ord er, the district court posed several questions

unanswered by the Mobbs Declaration, including what level of "affiliation" is necessary to warrant "enemy combatant" status or whether and why Hamdi was engaged
in combat. Id. at 11-12.
84 Id . at 14.
85 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 2003).
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constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to his war powers. 86
The Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's "pick it apart"
"piece by piece" treatment of the Mobbs Declaration, 87declaring
it a judicial interference with the allocation of war powers the
Constitution solely grants to the political branches. 88 An inherent part of warfare, the Fourth Circuit declared, is the detention
and capture of "enemy combatants," which is necessary to prevent "enemy combatants" from rejoining the enemy and to alleviate the administrative burden of prosecutions. 89
The Fourth Circuit suggested some limits to judicial deference
to executive decisions made in time of war, including that the
detention of U.S. citizens must be subject to habeas corpus review.90 However, in application the Fourth Circuit limited this
review to a deferential examination of purely legal questions
about Hamdi's detention, while refusing to conduct any factual
inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi's capture. On the legal
questions, the Fourth Circuit dismissed petitioner's challenge
that Hamdi's detention violated 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) because it
was conducted without an act of Congress. 91 Rather, it held that
Congress granted the President the authority to detain Hamdi
when it authorized the use of force in Afghanistan through the
September 18 Joint Resolution. 92 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the "use of all necessary and appropriate force" language of
the Joint Resolution must "include( ] the capture and detention
of any and all hostile forces arrayed against our troops. "93 The
Fourth Circuit also dismissed that Article 5 of the Geneva Convention required a determination of Hamdi's status as an enemy
86Id.
87Id.
88Id.

at 459.
at 462.
at 462-64 (referring to congressional powers under Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution to" 'provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States ... To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water ; To raise and support armies ...
[and] To provide and maintain a navy'" and to executive powers under Article II,
Section 2 declaring" '[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States'") (quoting U.S. CONST.art. I,§ 8 and art. II,
§ 2).
89Id. at 465.
90Id. at 464-65.
91Id. at 467. "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001(a) (West 2003).
92 Hamdi; 316 F.3d at 467.
93Id.
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belligerent "by a competent tribu°:al":: ~y declaring t~at t~e ?eneva Convention is not self-executmg. The Fourth Circmt highlighted the language in other general provisions of the Geneva
Convention calling for diplomatic resolution to disputes, 96 while
dismissing the relevance of the more specific language of Article
5.97 Further, the Fourth Circuit rejected, without much analysis,
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 created enforceable private right petitions
for violations to the Geneva Convention. 98
Further, the Fourth Circuit did not conduct a factual review to
determine the circumstances of Hamdi's capture in Afghanistan.
Rather, the Fourth Circuit declared that "because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat opera tions in a foreign country ... any inquiry must be circumscribed
to avoid encroachment into the military affairs entrusted to the
executive branch." 99 The Fourth Circuit decided that the district
court's attempt to learn the nature and scope of Hamdi's activities in Afghanistan would not only bring an Article III court into
conflict with the warmaking powers of Articles I and II, but may
compromise sensitive intelligence or result in a logistical
nightmare. 10 ° Further, the Fourth Circuit rejected that the
habeas corpus review requires a factual determination of
Hamdi's status as an "enemy combatant" once it is established
that the executive has a legal basis for the detention. 101 In fact,
the Fourth Circuit even rejected the executive's position that a
94 Id. at 468. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
95 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.
96 Id. (discussing Article 11 of the Geneva Convention which instructs states to
"arrange a 'meeting of the representatives ... with a view of settling the disagreement,'" and Article 132 which states that "'any alleged violation of the Convention'
is to be resolved by a joint transnational effort 'in a manner to be decided between
the interested Parties"') (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 94, at art. 11,
132).
97 The Fourth Circuit, for example, states that "competent tribunal" may not
mean an Article III court. Id. at 469.
98 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which confers on courts the power to grant the writ, reads, in
part, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . .. He is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241(b)(3) (West 2003). The Fourth Circuit simply concludes, however,
that it would make little practical sense for § 2241 to create a right to action, since
"we would have thereby imposed on the United States a mechanism of enforceabil ity that might not find an analogue in any other nation." Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 469.
99 Id. at 473.
100 Id . .at 470-71.
101 Id. at 471-73. But see infra notes 331-41 and accompanying text (discussing
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"some evidence" standard should govern the adjud ication of the
habeas factual review. 102 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Article III courts are ill-positioned to police the military's distinction
between those in the arena of combat who should be detained
and those who should not, concluding that this type of action
would run the risk of obstructing war efforts authorized by Congress and undertaken by the executive branch. 103
Absent from the Fourth Circuit's opinion is the substantial
concern the district court expressed over Hamdi's prolonged, incommunicado detention. To date, Hamdi remains in military
custody in Norfolk, Virginia, where he has been since April 2002.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion also does not resolve when Hamdi's
detention might cease to be lawful, although it does suggest that
his detention may last at least so long as U.S. troops are still on
the ground in Afghanistan, including reconstruction efforts. 104
On December 4, 2002, the Southern District of New York issued the first ruling on Padilla's habeas corpus petition. 105 The
decision has been reported as a victory for petitioners, 106 as the
district court, unlike the Fourth Circuit, did grant Padilla the
right to consu lt with counse l while his habeas corpus petition was
pending to prepare factual challenges to his classification as "enemy combatant." 107 However, the decision also represents a victory for the executive regarding its powers to detain and try
Padilla in military tribunals. Moreover, Padilla's victory to meet
with counsel could be diminished by national security measures
possibly affecting Padilla's private meetings with counsel and access to government information, as well as by the limited scope
separation of powers concerns as between the political branches not addressed by
the Fourth Circuit) .
102 Id. at 474.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 476.
105 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Judge
Makasey who wrote the opinion is the same judge who deferred to the executive's
interpretation of the material witness statute. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
106 Benjamin Weiser, Judge Says Man Can Meet with Lawyer to Challenge Det ention as Enemy Plott er , N.Y. TIM E S, Dec. 5, 2002, at A24.
107 Padilla, 233 F. Supp . 2d at 569-70. The executive did not oppose Padilla's legal
right to file a habeas corpus petition . Id. at 598-99. Therefore , the district court
presumed the habea s corpu s statut e to apply and only considered whether Padilla' s
attorney had next-friend standing; whether the secretary of defense was the appropriate respondent; whether the court had jurisdiction given that Padilla was no
longer in New York; and nature and scope of judicial review under the statut e. Id.
at 575-87, 604-10.
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and deferential standard of judicial review that will apply in his
case.
Like the Fourth Circuit, the district court affirmed the executive's authority to designate Padilla an "enemy combatant"
under both the president's inherent powers as commander in
chief 108 and Congress' September 18 Joint Resolution. 109 In so
holding, the district court rejected petitioner's challenges over
whether the executive can seize and detain U.S. citizens captured
on U.S. soil, absent a clear congressional declaration of war and
when the current conflict lacks clarity and scope of duration
given that the enemy is al Qaeda.11° Rather, the district court
principally relied on The Prize Cases 111 and Ex parte Quirin 112 to
uphold the executive's actions.113 Specifically, the district court
read Ex parte Quirin to authorize the executive to detain and try
unlawful combatants, including U.S. citizens, and cited dicta in
the case to hold that this power may be independent from congressional authority.114 The district court, moreover, rejected the
at 587-96.
at 596-99.
110 Id. at 587.
111 Id. at 587-89 (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)). The Court
rejected a challenge to the president's authority to impose a blockade on the secessionist states when there had been no declaration of war. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
at 635. The Prize Cases Court acknowledged that the president may not declare war
but held that the president has the authority to defend the country from acts of
aggression without waiting for special legislative authority. Id. The Court also held
that it is up to the president to determine in such circumstanc es the degree of force
the crisis demands. Id. at 670.
112 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). But see infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (distinguishing Ex parte Quirin from the 9/11 "enemy combatant" cases).
113 The district court also relied on the laws of war. For example, the district court
cited Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention to authorize the detention of all
combatants until the cessation of active hostilities. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 59293.
114 Id. at 595-96. Ex parte Quirin involved a habeas corpus challenge to sentences
rendered by a U.S. military court against eight German soldiers who smuggled
themselves into the United States, hid their uniforms, and planned sabotage before
being caught. Id. at 594. Two of the detainees claimed to have U.S. citizenship, yet
that claim did not change the outcome of the case. Id. The Supreme Court stated
that U.S. citizens who donned foreign uniforms and swore allegiance to a country at
war with the United States could lawfully be treated like other member s of the
armed forces. Id. at 605-07. By relying on Ex parte Quirin, the district court distinguished Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), which set aside Milligan's
conviction by military tribunals during the Civil War on the ground that civilian
courts were still in operation. In doing so, the district court distinguished Padilla
from Milligan in that Milligan was not an unlawful combatant. Padilla, 233 F. Supp.
at 593-94. Rather, the district court stated that Padilla, like the saboteurs in Ex parte
108 Id.

109 Id.
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argument that Ex parte Quirin is distinguishable because, unlike
the current conflict, Congress had declared war against Germany
during WWII. 115 To do so, the district court reasoned that such a
reading would be inconsistent with The Prize Cases, which did
not require a declaration of war to authorize inherent executive
national security powers.116 Furthermore, the district court resolved the issue of the uncertainty of scope and duration of the
current conflict simply by stating that so long as U.S. troops remain in al Qaeda and Afghanistan in pursuit of al Qaeda fighters,
there is no basis for contradicting the President's assertion that
the conflict is ongoing. 117 Finally, the district court held that
even if congressional authorization was deemed necessary to uphold Padilla's detention; the President has such authority under
the September 18 Joint ResolutionY 8 Like the Fourth Circuit,
the district court also considered that the Joint Resolution constituted an act of Congress, fulfilling the requirement under 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a) that: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or other wise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress. " 119
Thus , while Padilla will be permitted to meet with counsel, he
will not be able to challenge the legality of his military confine ment on legal grounds. Rather, Padilla will be allowed to meet
with his attorney solely to refute the factual allegations the executive has provided for deeming him an "enemy combatant." 120
Moreover, even Padilla's practical ability to refute the execuQuirin, is alleged to be in active association with an enemy with whom the United
States is at war. Id.
115 Id. at 595-96.
116 [d. The district court's conclusion that to limit Ex parte Quirin to its factsi.e., to authorize military tribunals against U.S. citizens only when Congress has declared war- would overrule The Prize Cases is unsupport ed. The facts in The Prize
Cases were predicated on the executive's need to act quickly to defend the United
States militarily against threats. See supra note 111. In contrast, Ex parte Quirin
deals with how states should mete out punishment to detained unlawful combatants
who do not represent the same immediate threat. Therefore, the cases are distinguishable on important facts.
117 Id. at 590-91.
118 /d. at 588-89, 595-99.
119 Id. at 595-99. But see infra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the
vague language of the statutory authority relied on by the executive for the military
tribunals).
120 Id. at 598-601. The district court furthermore held that Padilla neither had a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which applies to criminal proceedings, nor a
Fifth Amendment due process right where he has the remedy of the writ. Id. at 599603.
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tive's factual allegations will be substantially limited because the
district court will not require the executive to disclose informa tion relevant to that determination, based on national security
grounds. For example, the district court will not make available
the sealed Mobbs Declaration, but rather a redacted version that
excludes the executive's sources of information and the evidence
that corroborates its factual findings. 121 Finally, the district court
adopted a deferential standard of review to examine the executive's factual basis for classifying Padilla as an "enemy combatant." The district court will uphold such classification so long as
there is "some evidence" that Padilla engaged in a mission
against the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the
United States is at war and that evidence has not been entirely
mooted by subsequent events. 122
The executive's third victory occurred when two district courts
dismissed the habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of all or
some non-U.S. citizen detainees he ld as "enemy combatants" in
Guantanamo Bay. 123 The district courts did not reach the issue
of the executive's inherent powers to execute these detentions. 124
Instead, the district courts held that they lacked jurisdiction to
hear the petitions inter alia, 125because the habeas corpus statute126 does not apply to foreign nationals who, at no relevant
time, have not been within U.S. territorial jurisdiction. 127 In so
121Id. at 609-10.
122Id. at 607-08.
123See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.

2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah
v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part by 310 F.3d 1153 (4th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003).
124The D.C. petition for habeas corpus alleged, inter alia, a violation of the War
Powers Clause of the Constitution because the November 13 Military Order was not
authorized by Congress, and the powers vested in the executive pursuant to it were
too broad. Rasul v. Bush, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
28-33, 50-51
(D.C.C. Feb. 21, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/
rasulbush021902pet.html.
125The United States District Court for the Central District of California also
dismissed the lawsuit holding that petitioners lacked next-friend and third-party
standing to assert claims on behalf of the detainees. Coalition of Clergy, 189 F.
Supp. 2d at 1039-44.
12628 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948). The relevant provision reads: "Writs of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts
and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." Id. § 2241(a).
121The courts rejected that Guantanamo Bay is part of U.S. territory because
territorial jurisdiction requires that the territory be subject to U.S. sovereignty or
rule. Coalition of Clergy, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68-71.
But see infra notes 321-30 and accompanying text.
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holding, both district court s relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager .128
Eisentrager held that the writ should not be issued in the case of
German nationals tried in China for alleged war crimes commit ted in Japan. 129 The Central California District Court read
Eisentrager to apply when non-U.S. citizen "enemy combatants"
are captured outside U.S. territory. The Centra l California District Court stated that the Guantanamo Bay detainees are like
the petitioners in Eisentrager: "They are aliens; they were enemy
combatants; they were captured in combat; they were abroad
when captured; they are abroad now; since their capture, they
have been under the contro l of only the military; [and] they have
not stepped foot on American soil." 130 The D.C. District Court
did not read Eisentrager as "hiiig[ing] on the fact that petitioners
were enemy aliens, but on the fact that they were aliens outside
the territory over which the United States was sovereign." 131
Yet, the D.C. District Court acknow ledged that courts have
granted habeas corpus review to certain foreign nationa ls outside
U.S. territory, therefore also drawing a distinction between
"friend ly aliens and enemy aliens." 132 The D.C. District Court
distinguished "the friendly alien" line of cases from the Guantanamo Bay detainees because the former involved "a narrow class
of individuals who are akin to citizens, i.e., those persons seeking
to prove their citizenship and those aliens detained at the nation's ports." 133
On November 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and
vacated in part the Central California District Court. 134 Specifi128 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
129 Id. at 766.
130 Coalition of Clergy, 189

F. Supp. 2d, at 1048. But see infra notes 321-30 and
accompanying text (distinguishing Eisentrager from the Guantanamo Bay
detentions).
131 Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 67. But see infra notes 324-30 and accompanying text
(distinguishing Eisentrager from the Guantanamo Bay detentions).
132 Id. at 65. The court discussed Chin'Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908),
which permitted habeas action to a foreign national seeking admission to the country to assure a hearing on his claims to citizenship, and Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), which allowed a habeas petition by a foreign national who had been restrained and barred from landing in the United States .
133 Id. at 67. The court sometimes appears to distinguish among foreign national s
who can petition for habeas based on their degree of connection to the United
States, concluding more broadly that "if the individual is an alien without any connection to the United States, courts have generally focused on the location of the
alien seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States." Id.
134 Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 2073 (2003).
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cally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that petitioners lacked nextfriend and third -party standing to bring a habeas petition on behalf of the detainees because, inter alia, they did not have a significant pre-existing relationship with the detainees. 135
The Ninth Circuit, however , vacated the portions of the California district court opinion which reached the question of ju risdiction under Eisentrager, but on the basis of judicial restraint
rather than on the merits. The Ninth Circuit considered that
once the California district court found that petitioners lacked
standing to file the comp laint, its consideration of the additiona l
jurisdictional questions was unnecessary, and therefore, constituted an ultra viros act. 136 It is, therefore, still unclear whether
the Ninth Circuit would read Eisentrager differently than the two
district courts. On May 19, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
the petition for writ of certiorari without opinion. 137
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ninth Circuit
Guantanamo Bay case two months after the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed the D.C. District Court's
dismissal of the habeas corpus petition on behalf of Guantanamo
Bay detainees for lack of jurisdiction. 138 In affirming the district
court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia expanded the reading of Eisentrager to hold that all foreign nationals, whether friend ly or enemy, do not have a right to litigation in
the United States, unless they have established their presence in
U.S. territory. 139 The Court of Appea ls for the District of Columbia, therefore, rejected petitioner's position that the district
court could not dismiss the writ unless it first conducted a factual
determination of whether the detainees were, in fact, "enemy
aliens," which they denied. 14 ° Further, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia also rejected that , despite U.S. control,
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Bay is U.S. territory because the
United States has occupied it under a lease with Cuba since 1903
Id. at 1162-64.
Id. at 1164.
137 Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003).
138 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D .C. Cir. 2003).
139 Id. at 1141.
140 Id. at 1142. The petition, which was filed on behalf of three Guantanamo Bay
detainees, claimed that the Australian detain ee was living in Afghanistan when the
Northern Alliance captured him in early December 2001; that one of the British
detainees travel ed to Pakistan for an arranged marriage after September 11, 2001;
and that the other British detainee went to Pakistan after September 11, 2001 to visit
relatives and continue his comp uter education. Id. at 1137.
135
136

The 9/11 "National Security" Cases

1011

and despite the lease's indefinite term, the Naval Bay continues
to recognize the ultima te sovereignty of Cuba. 141

B.

"Material Witnesses"

In contrast to the "enemy combatant" cases, the courts' degree
of deference to the executive's interpretation of the "material
witness" statute has been inconsistent. The "ma terial witness"
statute authorizes a person's detention "[i]f it appears from an
affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is mate rial in [any] criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence qf the person by
subpoena ....
" 142 Dissent over the meaning of the statute
emerged with respect to whether, as the executive claims, the
"material witness" statute applies to secure testimony for a grand
jury proceeding, or, as petitioners suggest, only during the pretrial stages of a criminal trial. 143
Two judges of the Southern District of New York reached
vastly different conclusions. Regardless of which decision is
more consistent with the statute, the degree of deference the
judges accorded the executive's interpretation of the "material
witness" statute varied according to the judge's different notions
of the degree to which the cases implicated national security affairs, and therefore, the degree to which the Bill of Rights limits
the executive's powers.
Judge Scheindlin, who sided with petitioners, 144 revealed both
skepticism over the executive's claims that Awadallah's deten tion
is necessary to protect national security, as well as whether the
executive can act without regard to the Bill of Rights. In the case
before her, petitioner Awadallah challenged the legality of his
detention as a "material witness," and sought to suppress his
141Id. at 1142. But see infra notes 324-30 and accompanying text ( disputing that
Eisentrager should have controlled in the Guantanamo Bay cases).
14218 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 2000). The rest of the provision reads that "[n]o
material witness may be detained because of inabili ty to comply with any condition
of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition,
and if further deten tion is not necessary to prevent the failure of justi ce. Release of
a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Crimina l Procedur e." Id.
143United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re
Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d
287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
144Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
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grand jury testimony after the executive charged him with perjury for not admitting he knew one of the hijackers. 145 Judge
Scheindlin was certainly aware that Awadalla's detention took
place in the context of a national emergency. Yet, Judge
Scheindlin did not consider Awadalla's detention to be sufficiently related to terrorism and characterized his detention as not
based on probable cause to believe that he had committed any
crime. 146 Similarly, Judge Scheindlin's expression of deep concern over Awadalla's civil liberties reveals that she did not view
this case as giving rise to a political question. For examp le, to
introduce her opinion, she chose quotes from cases that either
limited the executive's claims to certain inherent war powers or
subjected Congress' war powers to Bill of Rights limitations.147
As to the facts, she included a detailed account of Awadalla's
treatment as a "material witness," including the length of his detention,148 isolation, 149 and physical mistreatment. 150 Judge
Scheindlin's recounting of those facts also challenged the executive's practice of keeping information about "material witnesses"
secret.
In contrast, Chief Judge Mukasey, aside from agreeing with
the executive's interpretation of the "material witness" statute, 151
showed little regard for the detainee's other allegations of abuse
of power under the statute, granting the executive complete dis145Awadallah apparently knew two of the hijackers. Id. During his grand jury
testimony he stated he did not know the name of one of the hijackers, but the government later discovered he wrote the hijacker's name in one of his school examinations. Id.
146Id. She similarly argued that conceding to the executive's interpretation of the
"material witness" statute would result in a 4th Amendment violation by allowing
.
the government to effectively skirt probable cause to detain. Id. at 76-79.
147Id. at 57. Judge Scheindlin quotes language from Ex parte Milligan , 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866), Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963), and
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
148Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 58. Awadallah remained detained as a material
witness for twenty-one days before being brought to testify before a grand jury. Id.
He was subsequently charged with perjury and remained imprisoned for a total of
eighty-three days before his release on bail. Id. at 59.
149Id. at 58. The executive treated Awadallah as a high-security inmate, detained
him in various prisons across the country, kept him in solitary confinement, and
denied him family visits, use of the phone, and, sometimes, access to his lawyer. Id.
at 58-60.
150Id. at 60. Awadallah was strip-searched every time he left his cell, had to wear
a "three -piece suit," had to render his grand jury testimony shackled to a chair, and
presented evidence that corroborated his allegations of physical abuse. Id. at 60-61.
151In re Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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cretion. In contrast to how much Judge Scheindlin revealed
about Awadalla, Judge Mukasey did not even disclose the identity of the petitioner, nor did he provide any facts indicating why
the government detained him as a "material witness." In fact,
Judge Mukasey asserted that the sole representation of the attorney general on the materiality of the witness was sufficient , stating that " [t)he government has so represented, and that shou ld
en d the matter." 152 This outcome is not surprising given Judge
Mukasey's characterization of the detainee: "Doe was not an attractive candidat e for bail, confined initially as a deportable alien
and the subject of a material witness warrant in connection with
the investigation of a ghastly attack." 153 Judge Mukasey appeared satisfied that any detention the executive ·linked to September 11, irrespective of its reasons, warranted courts granting
the utmost discretion to the executive.

C. National Security Secrets
Finally, in the cases dealing with the public's collective right to
know what "their Government is up to," 154 the courts either applied strict standards of judicial review or granted wide discretion
to the executive on whether to withhold information about the
detainees or to close immigration hearings to the public. The
courts' degree of deference to the executive's claims of national
security secrets turned on whether the courts viewed the executive's law enforcement practices as sufficiently linked to terrorism to warrant greater executive discretion, and relatedly, on the
courts' concerns over the executive's abuse of power.
In the FOIA litigation, the D.C. District Court ordered the executive to release the names of the detainees and of their lawyers, concluding that the executive failed to meet its burden
under the FOIA of proving why the information should not be
disclosed. 155 The FOIA exemptions relied on by the executive
152 Id. at 302. Judge Mukasey also dismissed petitioner's claim that the executive
delayed his deportat ion to detain him as a material witness, in part, by creating an
unprecedented duty on the part of the detainee to hasten his deportation. Id. at 301.
153

Id.

U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989).
155 Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U .S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97
(D.D.C. 2002). Applying the same standard , the court did not order the release of
the detainees' dates and locations of arrest, detention and release. On August 15,
2002, the court granted the government a stay of the order to release the names
pending appeal. Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 217 F. Supp. 2d
154
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permit law enforcement to withhold information when such information "could reasonably be expected" to "interfere with
[law] enforcement proceedings;" 156 "endanger the life or physical
safety of [any individual];" 157 or "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 158 The court did not read the "could
reasonably be expected" standard as requiring deference to law
enforcement.
There are two reasons for this result. First, while understanding that these detentions are occurring in the context of a national security crisis, the court recognized that the FOIA
distinguishes between the degree of judicial deference accorded
to government secrets about national defense actions (national
security), and that given to law enforcement practices. Related
to this is the court's skepticism as to whether the detentions were
sufficiently linked to terrorism that the court should grant the
executive the broader discretion granted under the FOIA to matters of national security. Second, the court was motivated by its
desire to safeguard the public's ability to hold the government
accountable for what it perceived to be abuses of power.
The district court immediately rejected the executive's attempt
to obtain the same level of judicial deference for secrets related
to its law enforcement practices as is generally accorded to national security secrets under the FOIA's first exemption (Exemption 1). 159 In fact, the court found it significant that the executive
did not rely on the FOIA's national security Exemption 1 in the
case. 160 Rather, the court read the law enforcement FOIA's exemptions to require the executive to provide the courts particularized and focused information for withholding each of the
discrete categories of information sought, rather than broad assertions as to all categories. 161 Thus, for example, the court ex58, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2002). On June 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the district court. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
156 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(A) (West 1996).
157 Id. § 552 (b )(7)(F).
158 Id. § 552 (b)(7)(C).
159 Ctr. for Nat'[ Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103 ("Exemption 1 protects matters that are 'specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.' 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b )(1). Exemption 1 cases receive considerable deference from the courts,
which must give 'substantial weight' to agency affidavits on national defense and
foreign policy issues.'') (citation omitted).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 104.
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amined each of the executive's claims that withholding the names
of the detainees and their lawyers would interfere with enforcement proceedings 162 and invalidated them when, inter alia, the
executive failed to substantiate the potential for the alleged
harm. 163 The court expressed skepticism, for instance, that the
detentions were sufficiently related to terrorism to support the
executive's conclusion that disclosing their names would interfere with the investigation. 164 In fact, the court noted that the
executive had already "ruled out" links to terrorism for hundreds
of detainees, insofar as only seventy-four of the original 751 detainees still remained in custody as of May 31, 2002.165 Therefore, the court concluded, in the absence of an allegation of
"reasonable specificity" that detainees have a connection to terrorism, the government's claims are pure speculation. 166 Similarly, the court refused to apply the executive's "mosaic theory,"
that revealing any "bits and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation" could allow terrorist organizations
to build a picture of the investigation to thwart the executive's
attempts to investigate and prevent terrorism. In so doing, the
court noted that such a theory has only been applied to national
security secrets under Exemption 1, and not to law enforcement
practices. 167
Second, the court was motivated by the strong policy interest
of safeguarding the public's right to hold its government account162 Id. at 101. The executive provided three reasons why the disclosure of the
detainee's names would interfere with law enforcement. Id. First, the disclosure of
the detainees' names could deter "knowledgeable witnesses" from cooperating because terrorist organizations may refuse to deal with them or may harass them. Id.
Second, the disclosure of their names could allow terrorist organizations to map the
progress of the investigation and thereby develop the means to impede them. Id.
Third, the public release of names could allow terrorist organizations to create false
or misleading information. Id.
163 Id. at 105. The court also invalidated the executive's assertions about the need
for secrecy when the government itself did not protect the information it was now
seeking to withhold. Id. at 102. The executive claimed, for example, that detainees
had the option of informing others of their detention. Id. at 102. The court also
highlighted that the executive contradicted its own rationale by its own extensive
practice of disclosure. Id.
164 Id. The court held that the executive did not establish a "rational link" between the disclosure of the detainees' names and harm to their cooperation in the
investigation on terrorism because it never proved that any of the detainees had any
connection to terrorism. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 103.
167 Id.
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able to the rule of law, a principle the court believed motivated
the FOIA's enactment. 168 The court considered this policy interest to be particularly strong when the executive conducts secret
arrests, "a concept odious to a democratic society." 169 The court
demonstrated its concern that the executive had abused its powers, particularly when detaining in secret and for prolonged periods "m aterial witnesses" who are not accused of crimes. 170 The
court observed: "[T)he Government has kept secret virtually
everything about these individuals, including the number of people arrested and detained, as well as their identities. The public
has no idea, whether there are 40, 400, or possibly more people
in detention on material witness warrants." 171 Thus, for example,
when evaluating the executive's claim that disclosing the names
of the detainees would infringe their privacy, the court held that
the detainees' privacy interests are outweighed by the public's
interests in "open[ing] agency action to the light of public scrutiny."172The court further stated that " [u]nqu estionably, the public's interest in learning the identities of those arrested and
detained is essential to verifying whether the Government is operating within the bounds of the law." 173
The executive, however, never had to release the names of the
detainees and their attorneys because on June 17, 2003, a split
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the D.C. District Court's order. 174 In contrast to the district
168 Id.
169 Id.

at 96.
(citing Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-42 (D.C. Cir.

1969)).
110 Id. at 104.
171 Id. at 106. In November of 2002, the med ia reported that in the fourteen
months of the nationwide terrorism investigation, defense attorneys have disclosed
that at least forty-four persons have been detained as material witnesses. Fairaru &
Williams, supra note 24. The article also reported that of the forty-four, twenty-nine
have been released, nine are still in custody-as material witnesses, criminal suspects, convicted felons, or immigration violators, and it is unclear what happened to
six mor e. Id . The executive, however, has refused to confirm these numbers, citing
court orders and grand jury secrecy rules , despite that only twenty of the forty-four
have ever been brought before a grand jury. Id. The court also noted tha t plaintiff's
complaints of mistreatment-denial
of right to counsel, prolonged detention, mistreatment of detainees-had been sufficiently substantial that the Department of
Justice's Office of the Inspector General has initiated an investigation into the executive's treatment of the detainees. Id. at 103.
172 Id. at 105.
173 Id. at 106.
174 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Sentelle & Henderson, JJ.) (Tatel, J., dissenting). The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's ruling that allowed withholding under Exemption 7(A )
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court and the dissenting opinion, the court of appeals majority
accorded the utmost judicial deference to the executive in times
of national security without considering the countervailing public's interest in being able to hold the executive accountable for
alleged Bill of Rights abuses.
The court of appeals allowed the executive to rely solely on the
FOIA's Exemption 7(A) (interference with law enforcement) to
withhold all the information sought by petitioners, reasoning that
the executive's declaration on the need for secrecy must be accorded appropriate judicial deference as a matter of national security and, therefore, as mandated by separation of powers. 175
The court of appeals stressed that, unlike law enforcement agencies, judges are ill-prepared to weigh the variety and subtle and
complex factors in determining whether disclosure of information would compromise an investigation. 176Further, the court of
appeals rejected that the executive's mosaic arguments should
apply solely to the FOIA's Exemption 1 (national security), as
judicial deference should depend on the substance of the danger
posed, rather than the FOIA exemption invoked. 177 Instead, the
court of appeals held that judicial deference should govern so
long as the executive's declaration raises legitimate concerns that
disclosure would impair national security. 178 Thus, the court of
appeals found reasonable the executive's argument that, despite
that the detainee's names were already public, a compiled list of
all the names would compromise the anti-terrorism investigation.179 The court of appeals further agreed with the executive
that disclosure of detainees' names could lead to retribution, increase their stigma, and, as a result, discourage cooperation .180
The court of appeals also rejected petitioner's argument that the
executive's claim for secrecy was undermined by its own disclosure practices. 181 It reasoned that courts should not second-guess
when the executive has chosen to release partial information for
tactical reasons. 182
some of the mor e compr ehensive detention information sought by plain tiffs. Id. at
933.
175Id. at 925, 928.
176Id. at 926-28.
177 Id . at 927-29.
178 Id. at 927.
179Id. at 926.
180 Id. at 929-30.
181Id. at 930.
182 Id.
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In addition to reversing the district court on FOIA grounds,
the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's arguments that disclosure
is independently required by the First Amendment and common
law right of access to government information. As to the First
Amendment, the court of appeals rejected that Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 183 which established a right of access to
criminal proceedings, should extend to non-judicial documents
tha t are not part of a criminal tria l.184 Rather, the court of appeals described Richmond Newspapers as a judicially created
limited First Amendment right, where the First Amendment does
not expressly address the right of the public to receive information.185 As such, the court of appeals refused to "convert the.
First Amendment right of access to criminal judicial proceedings" into a requirement of government disclosure, particularly
about an investigation where doing so could compromise the
government's ability to prevent terrorism. 186 Finally, the court of
appeals held that any common law right of access to information
was preempted by the FOIA. 187
Circuit Judge Tatel's strong dissent closely paralleled the district court's reasons for refusing the executive's request to keep
secret the names of the detainees and their attorneys . Tatel differed with the majority on three significant principles. First,
while acknowledging the executive's compelling interest to defend the nation against future acts of terrorism, Tatel criticized
the majority for entirely overlooking the public's compelling interest in knowing whether the executive, in responding to the
September 11 attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of
hundreds of persons it has detained. 188 For example, Tatel expressed grave skepticism that the public should have to accept
the executive's claims that detainees have access to counsel without question, particularly amidst allegations of prolonged, incommunicado detention of persons solely on the basis of religion and
ethnicity. 189 Second, Tatel reminded the majority that despite its
reliance on separation of powers, the court is being asked to interpret the FOIA, a statute that strongly favors openness, pre448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 933.
Id. at 933-34.
186 Id. at 935.
187 Id. at 936-37.
188 Id. at 937.
189 Id.
183
184
185
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cisely because Congress recognzied that an informed citizenry is
"vital to the functioning of a democratic society. " 190 Tatel, in
fact, admonishes the majority for refusing to "seco nd -guess" the
executive's judgments about matters of national security where
the courts would be doing "the job Congress assigned to the judiciary by insisting that the government do the job Congress assigned to it: provide a rationa l explanation of its reasons for
claiming exemption from FOIA's disclosure requirements. " 191
Third, Tatel criticized the majority for adopting a level of judicial
deference that amounts to rubber-stamping the executive's unsupported claims for secrecy, which is inconsistent even with the
heightened deference standard under the FOIA's Exemption 1
(national security). 192 Tatel observed that "[e]ven when reviewing Exemption l 's applicability to materials classified in the interest of national security, we have made clear that no amount of
deference can make up for agency allegations that display, for
example, a 'lack of detail and specificity, bad faith, [or] failure to
account for contrary record evidence,' since 'deference is not
equivalent to acquiescence.' " 193
With these principles in mind, Tatel explained why the executive failed to meet the FOIA federal law enforcement exemptions to withhold, not only the names, but the bulk of the
requested information about the detainees. 194 In summary, with
regard to Exemption 7(A) (interference with law enforcement),
Tatel criticized the executive's all-or-nothing categorica l denial of
all information ,195 despite the fact that most of the detainees
have no ties to terrorism. 196 Similarly, Tatel criticized the executive treating all the information requested about the detainees
the same without justifying why some of the information compromis es the investigation. 197 Tatel also questioned the execu190 Id. at 938 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242
(1978)).
191 Id. at 945.
192 Id. at 939-40.
193 Id. (quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
194 Id. at 940. Tatel also concluded that the government had no basis under any
FOIA exemption to withho ld the names of the detainees' attorneys. Id. at 949-51.
195 Jd. at 940.
196 Id. at 941-42. Tatel explains that a list of federally charged detainees attached
to the government's motion for summary judgment reported that only one detainee
had been criminally charged in the September 11 attacks and only 108 (out of 1182)
had been charged with any federal crime- primarily violations of antifraud statutes.
197 Id. at 943. Specifically, Tatel focuses on the executive's refusal to disclose the
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tive's selective disclosure of some of the detainee's information,
without providing an explanation for doing so. 198 With regard to
Exemption 7(C) (unwarranted invasion of privacy), Tatel found
that the detainee's personal interest in privacy was outweighed ·
by the public's interest in knowing whether the executive is violating the rights of detained persons. 199 On Exemption 7(F) (endanger to life and physical safety), since the executive claimed
retaliation against persons affiliated with terrorism, Tatel questioned why the release of names of persons not associated with
terrorism would also be endangered. 200 Lastly, .with regard to
Exemption 3,201 which encompasses Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e )'s prohibition of disclosure of "matters occurring
before the grand jury," Tatel refused to allow the executive to
rely on it with regard to persons who have neither testified
before grand juries nor were schedule d to do so.202
Fina lly, regarding the litigation challenging the executive's decision to close "special interest" immigration hearings, the Sixth
and Third Circuits are split on whether to require immigration
judges to make case-by-case determinations about the need to
close a hearing. 203 The executive unilaterally sought to close immigration hearings in "special interest" 204 deportation cases, asserting arguments analogous to those in the FOIA litigation that
open hearings would compromise the anti-terrorism investigation
and stigmatize the detainees. 205 Both circuits applied the Richmond Newspapers 206 "experience and logic" standard to deterdates of detention and release, which could reveal to the public how long persons
have been detained, raising concerns about possible constitutional violations.
198 Id. at 943-44.
199 Id. at 946. Tatel also doubted the executive's concern over the detainee's privacy interest, when it has already disclosed so much information about them. Id. at
945.
200 Id. at 948.
201 Exemption 3 exempts from disclosure matters that are "specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute ... , provided that such statute ... requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (West 2003).
202 Ctr. for Nat'[ Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 948.
203 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002)
(reversing the district court) .
204 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
205 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705; N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at
202.
206 Richmond Newspapers , Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (finding a First
Amendment right to open criminal trials).
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mine whether the newspaper publisher petitioners had a First
Amendment right to attend immigration hearings, a finding that
would apply a strict scrutiny standard to the executive's decision
to close the hearings. The circuits disagreed that deportation
hearings, at least those that implicated a national security concern, met the Richmond Newspapers "experience and logic"
standard, with only the Sixth Circuit holding that the petitioners
had a First Amendment right to attend such hearings. 207 Underlying the circuits' different application of the Richmond Newspapers standard to the deportation hearings were the courts'
opposing views on whether the executive, by ordering all "special
interest cases" closed, was legitimately acting within the scope of
national security affairs.
The Richmond Newspapers First Amendment "right of access"
standard requires courts to consider "whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public
[the experience prong] ... [and] whether public access plays a
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question [the logic prong]." 208 The Third Circuit applied
this two-prong test more strictly against petitioners than the Sixth
Circuit. On the "experience prong," for example, which required
a historical analysis of the openness of deportation proceedings,
the Third Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's conclusion
that a history of presumptively open deportation hearings, rather
than an express Congressional mandate to open deportation
hearings, sufficed to establish a tradition of openness. 209 In con207

Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704; N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. , 308 F.3d at

219.
208 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at 209 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (Press Enterprise III)).
209 Id. at 212-13. The Sixth Circuit, for example, found the fact that Congress had
repeatedly enacted statutes closing exclusion, but never deportation hearings, to be
compelling evidence that deportation hearings have traditionally been open. Detroit
Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit considered it relevant that
since 1965, INS regulations have explicitly required deportation proceedings to be
presumptively open, a position that Congress never amended, despite numerous revisions to the immigration laws. Id. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted that part
of the explanation as to why Congress has never closed deportation hearings resided
in Congress' recognition that deportees enjoy greater procedural rights than those
who are excluded from the United States. Id. at 702. In contrast, the Third Circuit
expressly rejected petitioner's argument that Congress' practice of closing exclusion
proceedings while remaining silent on deportation proceedings creates a presumption that it intended deportation hearings to be open. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc.,
308 F.3d at 212-13.
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trast to the Sixth Circuit, 210 the Third Circuit declined to find that
deportation hearings "boast a tradition of openness sufficient to
satisfy Richmond Newspapers ."211
More revea ling, however, was the Third Circuit's unprecedented decision to incorporate the nationa l security analysis into
the "logic prong," rather than (as did the Sixth Circuit) treat
these concerns as evidence of a compelling state interest and apply it to a strict scrutiny standard. 212 Prior applications of the
"logic prong" had only inquired into whether openness played a
positive role in a given proceeding. 213 Thus, when applying the
"logic prong," courts evaluated solely the presence of values
served by openness, including the promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs; a perception of fairness; the therapeutic value of open hearings; and accountability of public
officials.214 In contrast, the Third Circuit decided that the "logic
prong" must also "take [into] account the flip side-t he extent to
which openness impairs the public good." 215 Thus, the Third Circuit balanced the executive's arguments that open deportation
hearings would threaten national security by revealing sources
and methods of the ongoing terrorist investigation. 216 The execu tive advanced, inter alia, the "mosaic" theory, namely that even
minor pieces of evidence that might appear innocuous would
provide valuable clues and allow terrorists to piece information
together from the different cases to see a pattern that would reveal the course and gaps in the investigation. 217 While the Third
Circuit conceded to petitioners that the executive's arguments
were specu lative, it nonethe less declined to conduct a judicia l inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, determining
that "national security is an area where courts have traditionally
extended great deference to Executive expertise." 218 Moreover,
the Third Circuit mentioned only in passing the dangers .of deference to the executive when constitutional liberties are at stake,
210 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 ("Nonetheless, deportation proceedings historically have been open. Although exceptions may have been allowed, the general
policy has been one of openness.").
211 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at 212.
212 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707-10.
213 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc., 308 F.3d at 202.
214 Id. at 217.
215 Id. at 202.
216 Id. at 217-19.
217 Id. at 218-19.
218 Id. at 219.

The 9/ 11 "Nati on al Security " Cases

1023

especially in times of national crisis.21 9 Ultimately, however, the
Third Circuit declined to conclude that "[o]n balance .. . open ness plays a positive role in special interest deportation hearings
at a time when our nation is faced with threats of such profound
and unknown dimension. "220
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit did not incorporate the national
security analysis into the "logic prong," and held that public access played a significant positive role in deportation hearings. 221
By finding a First Amendment right of access to deportation
hearings, the Sixth Circuit then subjected the executive's allegations of national security concerns to a strict scrutiny standard. 22 2
The Sixth Circuit also considered the executive's arguments, including the mosaic theory justification for closing all "special interest" deportation hearings. 223 Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit also claimed to .defer to the executive's judgment that certain information revealed during removal proceedings could impede the ongoing anti-terrorism investigation. 224 However, the
opinion subsequently reveals the court's deep skepticism of the
executive's claims. When the Sixth Circuit criticized the Creppy
Directive, for example, for not being narrowly tailored, 2 25 it observed that the directive "does not apply to a 'small segment of
particularly dangerous ' information but a broad, indiscriminate
range of information, including information likely to be innocuous."226 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit criticized the executive for
not using a definable standard to determine what constitutes a
"special inte rest" case.22 7 In fact, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
executive even conceded that certain non-U.S. citizens known to
have no links to terrorism will be designated "special interest"
cases, supposedly to foreclose the terrorists' ability to d~aw infer ences abou t the investigation on the basis of which hearings are
219 Id.
220 Id.

at 220.

221 De troit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2002) (findin g
that openness in depor tation hearings protects against unfairness; enh ances the qua lity of the hea ring; serves a therapeutic purpose; and, particularly afte r September 11,
enh ances the perception of integrity and fairnes s of the process and ensur es greater
citizen part icipation in governm ent).
222 Id. at 704-09.
223 Id. at 705-07.
224 Id . at 707.
22s Id .
226 Id. at 692.
221 Id.
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open or closed.228 The Sixth Circuit also challenged the executive's assertion about the need for secrecy when the executive
had already allowed detainees to disclose much of the information.229 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the executive's
"mosaic intelligence" claims to national security as mere speculation,230 which only heightened the need to protect the First
Amendment:
Today, the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard away
from the public by placing its actions beyond public scrutiny.
Against non-citizens, it seeks the power to secretly deport a
class if it unilaterally calls them "special interest" cases. The
Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's lives, outside the
public eye, and behind a closed door. Democracies die behind
closed doors. 231

Thus, even in the few opinions in the post-September 11 litigation to date, there are marked differences. What explains these
different results? Why are the courts so preoccupied in some
cases with individual rights and so willing in others to defer to the
executive? Do these opinions merely reflect the judge's own political inclinations? Or are there some guiding principles that explain their decision -making? Part II.B explores three principles
that potentially guide judges' decision-making in national security cases. These principles explain, in part, the differences in the
post-September 11 litigation.
While the judges ' personal views undoubtedly play a role in
the outcome of the litigation, such an explanation is far too simple to be satisfactory. National security cases present judges with
a host of reasons why they should not intervene, 232 including that
a judicial misstep due to lack of expertise in national security
matters may result in grave harm to the nation. 233 At the same
time, however, judges must uphold important principles in the
Constitution. What role should separation of powers concerns
play in their decision-making? What role should the Bill of
Rights have? The judiciary's attempt to balance these difficult
Id.
229 Id. at 708.
230 Id. at 709.
231 Id. at. 683.
232 See Kaplan, supra note 43, at 1830-59 (discussing and critiquing the normative
228

rationales that influence jud ges' decisions not to intervene in matters of national
security).
233Id. at 1804.
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considerations are reflected in the guiding principles discussed
below.
II

A.

The National Security/Domestic Affairs Dichotomy
Post-September 11

The preliminary results of the post-September 11 litigation reveal a general pattern of greater deferenc e to the executive in its
treatment of "enemy combatant" detainees. This result can be
explained, at least in part, by the greater degree of deferenc e
courts accord the executive when its acts more clearly implicate
national security than domestic affairs.
The national security/domestic affairs dichotomy grew princi pally from the language and facts in Curtiss-Wright 234 and
Youngstown. 235 Curtiss-Wright involved the criminal indictment
of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation for violating President
Roosevelt's executive order (adopted pursuant to a joint resolution from Congress) by selling machine guns to Bolivia. 236 The
Curtiss-Wright Court characterized the President's actions as implicating purely external affairs, over which he retained extraconstitutional inherent powers. 237 Youngstown involved President Truman's attempt, based solely on an executive order, to
seize privately-owned steel mills in the United States in order to
avert an industry-wide strike that the executive alleged would adversely affect the United States' position in the Korean War.238
Most commentators agree that whereas Youngstown implicated
national security concerns (the Korean War), its facts should be
considered to involve more domestic affairs because the
seizure-the takeover of an entire industry-had only an attenuated link to the war efforts. 239
These two cases have generally been paired as reflecting two
competing positions on the nature of the executive's powers in
national security matters. 24 ° Curtiss-Wright has become the
lodestar for those who advocate for executive inherent powers in
234
235
236
237

238
239

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952).
Brownell, supra note 49, at 17-19.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 104.

240 A few scholars treat Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown as unrelated, reading the
former as concerning the president's inherent powers in national security and the
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national security affairs. 241 In contrast, Youngstown is favored
by those who support a vision of shared power among the three
branches of government in matters of national security. 242 Some
in this latter camp, for example, have read Youngstown as overruling Curtiss-Wright .243 Yet, many national security cases decided since Youngstown have followed the Curtiss-Wright
rationale. 244 This means that the co-existence of Curtiss-Wright
and Youngstown has created some ambiguity, which has yet to be
resolved by the Supreme Court 245 and scholars alike. 246
Without attempting to resolve the ambiguity or constitutiona l
faithfulness of the Curtiss-Wright/Youngstown co-existence, this
analysis of the post-September 11 litigation is premised on the
observation that nationa l security cases decided since CurtissWright and Youngstown consistently reveal that the courts grant
the executive greater discretion to act in regard to national security than in domestic affairs. 247 Thus, for example, executive actions pursuant to congressional delegation in national security
affairs have a greater probability of being uphe ld than similar
actions in the domestic sphere. 248 Similarly, the executive also
has a greater chance that its actions will be upheld even when
Congress is silent, provided its actions implicate national security
matters. 249
latter as concerning the lack of executive inherent powers in domestic affairs. Id. at
10 n.15.
241 Id. at 8.
242 Id. at 9.
243 See KoH, supra note 43, at 108-112.
244 See id. at 134-46 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981), INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983),
and Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)).
245 Brownell, supra note 49, at 9. In the only U.S. Supreme Court case that has
addressed the relationship between Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown, the Court acknowledged their ambiguity but did little to resolve it. Id. at 65-69 (discussing
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662). Most commentators have characterized Dames
& Moore as talking like Youngstown but walking like Curtiss-Wright because ulti-

mately the Court upheld executive orders issued by Presidents Carter and Reagan to
unfreeze Iranian assets and suspend all claims in U.S. courts against Iran during the
Iran-Hostage Crisis, although such action was not authorized by Congress. Id.
Dames & Moore deviated from Youngstown because in the latter case, congressional silence and legislative history was interpreted against the president, whereas
the opposite was true in Dames & Moore . Id. at 66.
246 Id. at 70-109 (discussing six different interpretations of Curtiss-Wright or
Youngstown).
247 Id. at 77, 107.
248 Id. at 102.
249 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79.
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Most, if not all national security cases,250however, will also
interfere in domestic affairs. Therefore, the courts, as in Youngstown, will likely need to assess to what extent a particular case is
less about national security and more about domestic affairs, to
determin e the appropriate degree of deference. This assessment
is not easy, as the distinction between national security and domestic affairs is often difficult. 251 The national security/domestic
affairs distinction, when applied to the new so-called war on terrorism, for example, can easily become muddled, given the complex combination of concrete and elusive factual an~ legal factors
that have characterized it.
On the one hand, many of the characteristics of the September
11 events, and of the government's response to those events, are
those of a country defending itself from a grave external threat to
its national security. The horrible events of September 11 offer
tangible and compelling evidence that the United States was the
target of an attack comparable in magnitude to Pearl Harbor,
and yet more callou s, insofar as civilians were used as weapons
and became the principal targets. Moreover, although the attack
was not orchestrated by a nation, substantia l consensus emerged
that the attack constituted an act of aggression that justified U.S.
military retaliation in self-defense. 252 Two months after the attack, the United States launched a military strike in Afghanistan
for "harboring" al Qaeda. The executive undertook this military
response with the approval of most nations, 253the United Nations, 254and the U.S. Congress. 255 This fact was significant be250 It could be persuasively argued, for instance, that Curtiss-Wright, which also
involved criminal sanctions against a domestic corporation , did not involve completely national security concerns. Brownell, supra note 49, at 88.
251Id. at 103. See also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 43, at 352.
252 Artic le 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in relevant part: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTERart. 51, para. 1.
253 See sup ra note 3 and accompanying text.
254 See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 2. In addition, NATO's North Atlantic Council
stated that it regarded the attack as an action implicating Article V of the Washington Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of the Allies
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all." Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, NATO Chief Stresses Internationa l Resolve:
Remarks by the President and NATO Secretary General Lord Roberton in Photo
Opportunity (Oct. 10, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/
print/20011010-6.html.
255 See September 18 Joint Resolution, supra note 1.
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cause it signaled that attacks carried out by non-state actors
(such as al Qaeda) could be considered acts of war 256 and that,
moreover, state responsibility for such acts may extend to those
nations who "harbor" the perpetrators. 257 It was in the course of
this large ly sanctioned U.S. strike in Afghanistan that the U.S.
military captured and detained hundreds of "prisoners of war" in
Afghanistan and in Guantanamo Bay, and at least three persons
in the United States. 258 Existing laws of war authorize the deten tion of combatants, despite serious concerns that the United
States is violating the minimal protections guaranteed to "prisoners of war" under these instruments. 259
Based on these factors, the courts' greater deference to the executive in its detention of "enemy combatants" is explained, in
part, because courts reasonably view these detentions as within
the scope of nationa l defense. In the past, the Supreme Court
has upheld the detention and military trials of "enemy combatants," including those who are U.S. citizens. 260 This is not to say,
256 But see Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc
DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 M1cH.J. INT'LL. 677, 685 (2002) (concluding that the
al Qaeda attacks on the United States "cannot be prosecuted as war crimes because
the United States and al Qaeda cannot be 'at war' under international law").
257 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A PolicyOriented Assessment, 43 HARV.INT'L L.J. 83, 100 (2002).
258 The United States captured most individuals detained in Guantanamo Bay on
or near the battlefield in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Some, however, came from further afield, such as the six Algerian detainees arrested and transported to Guantanamo Bay from Bosnia . By mid-August of 2002, some 598 suspected Taliban and al
Qaeda prisoners, nationals of at least forty-three countries, had been transferred to
the U.S. base at Guantanamo. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Year of
Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties Since September 11, at 43 (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee Report], at http://www.lchr.org/us_law/loss/loss_report.
pdf .
. 259 Foremost, for example, is the fact that the November 13 Military Order does
not distinguish between lawful and unlawful combatants. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111
YALE L.J. 1259, 1263 (2002). In fact, although the President has involved the language of war, he has ignored the cardinal principle of the laws of war that "individuals" detained as combatants engaged in fighting must be released when the
hostilities cease, unless they are found to have committed war crimes. See George
P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals,
25 HARV.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 635, 636 (2002). See also Lawyers Committee Report,
supra note 258, at 44-48. But see Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("So long as American troops remain on the ground in
Afghanistan and Pakistan in combat with and pursuit of al Qaeda fighters, there is
no basis for contradicting the President's reported assertions that the conflict has not
ended."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) (same).
260 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (holding that unlawful combatants are
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces and,
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however, that the detentions of "enemy combatants" since September 11 do not raise concerns that the executive may be exceeding the reasonable scope of military detentions. 261
For example, despite the district court's reliance on Ex parte
Quirin to uphold the legality of Padilla's detention, 262 Padilla's
detention is sufficiently distinct from the eight defendants who
were, in fact, uniformed members of the German military who
donned civilian clothing after surreptitiously entering the United
States to engage in sabotage on behalf of a state against which
Congress declared war. In contrast, while the executive alleges
that Padilla intended to disperse a dirty bomb in the United
States on behalf of al Qaeda, 263 Padilla is not alleged to have
taken part in the U.S. armed conflict in Afghanistan nor in the
September 11 attacks. Padilla could well be tried criminally for
his alleged attempted act of terrorism in the United States, although it is less persuasive that he should be treated as an "enemy combatant." The inte rnationa l community has yet to reach
consensus on who is a terrorist, or on when a terrorist can be said
to have become an "enemy combatant," 264 and yet this question
was not addressed by the Padilla district court. The military's
powers to detain under the November 13 Military Order 265 is
in addition, to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerence unlawful). The President's authority to detain "enemy combatants"
presents a different question than whether the Constitution places any limits on his
treatment of such detainees, including denial to their right to judicial review. See
discussion infra Part 11.B.
261 See ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 7, at 10; Fletcher, supra note 259, at
635.
262 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 591-95.
263 Id. at 572. The Mobbs Declaration states, inter alia, that Padilla traveled to
Afghanistan in 2001 to discuss the "dirty bomb" plan with a senior al Qaeda member and that he received training from al Qaeda operatives to conduct terrorism.
264 See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Terrors of Dealing with September 11th, 10
NEv. LAw. 7, at 7, 15 (Sept. 2002).
265 Section 3 of the Bush Military Order authorizes and directs the Secretary of
Defense to take into custody and "detain[ ] at an appropriate location ... outside or
within the United States" all "individual[s] subject to the order." November 13 Military Order, supra note 17. Section 2 of the Order defines "individual subject to this
order" to mean:
any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom [the
President] determine[s] from time to time in writing that there is reason to
believe that such individual ... (i) is or was a member of the organization
known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that
have caused, threatened to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or
adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
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also not limited to individuals associated with al Qaeda or who
knowingly participated in terrorist acts. 266
Another example of executive overreach in matters of national
security is the proposed military tribunals in the November 13
Military Order. The executive's inherent power to detain enemy
combatants as war prisoners is distinct from its power to adjudicate their guilt and mete out their punishment, the latter generally requiring congressional authorization. 267 Yet, the executive
has already designated six Guantanamo Bay prisoners as eligible
for tdals before military commissions. 268 In this regard, the President has offered a rather weak claim to have promulgated the
November 13 Military Order pursuant to prior congressional authorization by relying on unrelated languag e of the September 18
Joint Resolution and provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). 269 The September 18 Joint Resolution is best
policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [in the first two categories above].
Id. The executive has not made available the text of the orders for the detention of
U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants." See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
266 See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 259, at 1261 (arguing that the range of people
eligible for capture under the November 13 Order is vast and could potentially jeopardize the rights and liberties of approximately 20 million non-U.S. citizens in the
United States as well as any non-U.S. citizen anywhere in the world). Katyal and
1ribe criticize specifically that the November 13 Ord er's only standard for jurisdiction is President Bush's unilateral written statement that he has "reason to believe"
that a particul~r non-U.S. citizen at some point committed, or aided or abetted, a
named terrorist organization. Id. This could include, for example, a member of the
Irish Republican Army who threatens the American embassy in London. Id. More
problematic is the fact that neither "aid(ed] or abet[ted]" a terrorist, nor "act(ed] in
preparation ... for" terrorism, contain a mens rea requirement. Id. at 1263. The
November 13 Order, therefore, could include entirely innocent conduct "such as
hiring a car for a friend when the friend turns out to be a terrorist, or donating
money to a charity when that charity turns out to be a front for terrorism." Id.
267 Id. at 1266-95 (concluding that absent an emergency that threatens truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, or when the president establishes
such tribunals in conquered territory, the Constitution's text and judicial precedent
require congressional authorization for military tribunals). See also Jord an J . Paust,
Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. lNT'L L. 1, 1
(2001) [hereinafter Paust, Courting Illegality]. But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREENBAG 2o
249, 250 (2002) (arguing that President Bush probably had independent constitutional authority to issue the November 13 Military Order as commander in chief).
268 Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses: The Legal Context; Tribunals Move
from Theory to Reality, N.Y. TIMES,July 4, 2003, at A12.
269 A few scholars have also argued that Article 15 of the Articles of War, now
codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice[UCMJ] at 10 U.S.C. § 821 provides
the president's strongest argument for such statutory authority. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 252-53.
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understood as Congress' authorization to the executive to use
military force in Afghanistan. At least one district court and the
Fourth Circuit have agreed with the executive that the "use of all
necessary and appropriate force" language in the September 18
Joint Resolution must include the detention of "enemy combatants" as an inherent component of warfare. 270 Whether courts
will also consider military trials as inherent components of warfare remains to be seen when these have required congressional
authorization. Similarly, scholars questio n that the UCMJ could
be read to authorize the proposed military tribunals. 271
On the other hand, most certain is that the executive has a
substantially weaker claim to inherent national security powers
when its detentions involve persons with respect to whom the
executive lacks evidence linking them to the September 11 attacks or to al Qaeda. In the aftermath of September 11, the executive has also conducted a so-called domestic war on terrorism in
ways that conjure up images of the United States' past elusive
wars, as for example against a perceived communist threat, 272 or
210 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 594-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Hamdi v. Rumse ld, 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4th Cir. 2003).
271 Katya l & Tribe, supra note 259, at 1288-89 (rejecting the argument that the
UCMJ author ized the creation of such military tribunals since in general the statute
has been read narrowly to avoid military trials, in the absence of a formal declara tion of war, of those who do not serve in our armed forces); Michal R. Belknap, A
Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. Rev. 433, 441 (2002) ("The statutory basis for military commissions is so thin as to be almost invisible. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) ... does little more than acknowledge the existence of such tribunals.") ;
Juan R. Torrvella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and
the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.L. 648, 666-67 (2002).
272 For example, during WWI, the Espionage Sedition Act of 1917 led to the conviction of many socialist leaders and 150 members of the Industrial Workers of the
World. Bucklin, supra note 48, at 89. During the Depression, the 1938 House Committee of Un-American Activities (HUAC) investigated anyone its members assumed had participated in a communist conspiracy to cause economic chaos and
subversion in the United States. Id. at 90. Those investigated included the Boy
Scouts, the Camp Fire Girls, and Shirley Temple. Id. During WWII the Smith Act
of 1940 prescribed the prosecution of anyone who engaged in activities deemed to
"interfere with or impair the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the armed services," or
who advocated "overthrowing or destroying the government in the United States by
force or violence." Id. at 93-94. When WWII ended, President Truman created the
Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty to test the loyalty of all federal employees, while HUAC resurfaced to "investigate" members of the Hollywood entertainment industry. Id. at 94-95. In 1950, the McCarran Act made it illegal for a
member of a Communist organization to "hold any nonelective office or employment under the United States," or to "engage in any employment in any defense
facility," or "to apply for or use a passport." Id. at 95. During the Vietnam War,
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against all foreigners or U.S . citizens who look like the enemy. 273
Such "wars" become elusive not solely when the threat to national security is uncertain (unlike the threat of communism, few
question that terrorism is a viable threat), but also when so many
become too easily branded or treated as the "enemy."
In the course of this "domestic war on terrorism," the executive has detained more than 1000 individuals, often in secret, incommunicado detention, for prolonged periods of time. 274 Yet,
from what the public knows, it appears that fewer than 0.3 percent of the detained have been charged with terrorist acts or
linked to al Qaeda. 275 For this reason, members of Congress and
civil rights groups have expressed concern that overwhelmingly
the detainees' connection to terrorism or al Qaeda is attenuated,
at best. 276 Many detainees were identified to the executive
through "suspicions and tips based solely upon perceptions of
their racial, religious, or ethnic identity." 277 Moreover, many of
these detentions were the result of the executive's practice of raPresident Nixon continued the "red-baiting" tactics by establishing a secret police
and by attacking the right of political dissent, this time without congressional approval. Id. at 95-96.
·
273For example, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1917-1918 allowed the president
to detain enemy non-U.S. citizens in time of war and to deport any non-U.S. citizen
(not just "enemies") he deemed a threat to national security. Id. at 86. The Alien
Act of 1918 authorized the attorney general to deport any non-U.S. citizen without
the benefit of due process if they were members of an organization which the chief
law enforcement agent of the nation thought was advocating the overthrow of the
government. Id. at 90. In 1920 alone, more than 4000 suspected subversives were
arrested in thirty-three cities. Id. The Smith Act of 1940 also required all non-U.S.
citizens to register with the government and to be fingerprinted if over fourteen
years of age. Id. at 94. In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, over
110,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans were ordered interred. Id. at 91.
274See supra notes 7-11 and 20-33 and accompanying text.
275See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
276147 CONG . REC. S13923 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2001) (statem ent of Sen. Feingold)
("[W]e still do not know the identities of hundreds of other individuals still held in
detention, the vast majority of whom have no link to September 11 or al-Qa[ e]da.").
See also U.S.: Ensure Protections for Foreign Detainees, Human Rights News, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/ll/pakfordet1201.htm (Dec. 1, 2002) ("Most of the
criminal charges are reportedly minor and not directly linked to terrorism.").
277Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575, 1578 (2002). See also The OIG Report , supra note 4, at 15-16 ("[T]he
762 aliens classified as September 11 detainees were arrested by FBI-led terrorism
task forces pursuing investigative leads . .. rang[ing] from information obtained
from searches of the hijackers ' cars and personal effects to anonymous tips called in
by members of the public suspiscious of Arab and Muslim neighbors who kept odd
schedules."); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58
N.Y.U. ANN . SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002).
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cial profiling, in which it purported to conduct "voluntary interviews" of more than 5000 male foreign nationals from Middle
Eastern or Islamic countries. 278 More recently, the executive has
continued this same practice with the recent INS requirement
that certain non-immigrants, mostly Arab men, register with the
INS.279 Perhaps more telling is that the executive has released
most of the detainees or has deported them in secret, without
ever charging them with a crime. 280
These facts explain why at least some judges have viewed these
post-September 11 detentions as mostly law enforcement, with
some national security implications (i.e., Youngstown), rather
than as a legitimate national defense operation (i.e., CurtissWright). Thus, for instance, these judges did not defer to the executive's broad interpretation of the material witness or FOIA
statutes. For example, Judge Scheindlin construed the material
witness statute narrowly, in order to avoid a Fourth Amendment
violation. 281 Similarly, Judge Kessler and Judge Tatel conducted
a careful review of the executive's claims that information sought
in the FOIA request must be kept secret, rejecting claims when
they were unsubstantiated or contradictory. 282 In contrast, Chief
Judge Mukasay, Judge Sentelle and Judge Henderson did not
question the executive's characterization of the domestic war on
terrorism as a matter of national security, and, therefore, deferred broadly to the executive on its interpretation of the material witness or FOIA statutes. 283
In the past, courts have also acquiesced, sometimes reluctantly,
to these elusive domestic wars, as for example when the Supreme
Court uphe ld the internment of tens of thousands of Japanese
and Japanese Americans during World War II. 284 Many have
questioned whether such detentions could be affirmed in any
Volpp, supra note 277, at 1578.
See supra note 23. See also Victor C. Romero, Decoupling 'Terrorist' from
'Immigrant': An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE
& JusT. 201 (2003) (arguing that Attorney General Ashcroft's use of immigration
proceedings in war against terrorism is improper, given that immigration remedy is
deportation, not prosecution).
280 See supra notes 23, 135 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 158-66, 187-201 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 150-52 and 173-86 and accompanying text.
284 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) ("Compulsory
exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances
of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental
institutions.")
278
279
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court of law today .285 Indeed, Korematsu has been so discredited
that it is also doubtful that the executive would even rely on its
holding to support the current domestic war on terrorism. 286
Nonetheless, two additional factors distinguish Korematsu from
the present case. First, the Supreme Court decided Korematsu
after Congress had issued a formal declaration of war against Japan. 287 Second, the Supreme Court held that President
Roosevelt issued his executive order to intern Japanese and Japa nese Americans with full congressional authorization. 288 To date,
Congress has not issued a formal declaration of war against al
Qaeda, nor is it clear that Congress could do so under existing
international law.289 Second, even if the executive has been successful in asserting that Congress has authorized the detention of
al Qaeda member s and those who harbor them, 290it does not
follow that all or most post-September 11 detentions meet this
criteria. In fact, if they did, the executive could (and would)
likely hold them as "enemy combatants." Until the executive
does so, however, courts are right to treat non -"e nemy combat ant" detentions as principally within the scope ·of the executive's
law enforcement powers, not within national security.
285 See Sandra Takahata, The Case of Korematsu v. United States: Could it be
Justified Today?, 6 U. HAw. L. REV. 109 (1984). See also Neil Gotanda, "Other
Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1186, 1192 (1985).
286 Unlike the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans, the executive has
never claimed (and would not want to claim) that its sweeping detention practices
have been necessary to remove persons who represe nt a threat to the United States.
Rather, the executive has argued that the clandestine nature in which terrorist
groups operate makes it necessary for the government to conduct such sweeping
investigations. See Padilla v. Bush, Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Civ. No. 02-4445, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2002), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush62602gmot.pdf. ("[T]he al Qaeda
network and those who support it remain a serious threat, as does the risk of future
terrorist attacks on United States' citizens and interests carried out, as were the
attacks of September 11, through covert infiltration of the United States by enemy
belligerents."). Unfortunately, the current government practices, which have mostly
targeted the Muslim and Arab communities in the United States, have enormous
commonalities with what happened to the Japanese and Japanese Americans during
World War IL See Volpp, supra note 277, at 1591.
287Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-17.
288 Id .
289 See supra note 238. But see Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (deeming the September 18 Joint Resolution a declaration
of war against al Qaeda).
290Both the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi and the district court in Padilla found that
the September 18 Joint Resolution authorized Hamdi's and Padilla's detentions. See
supra notes 92-93 and 118-19 and accompanying text.
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Distinguishing Between "Inherent " Executive National
Security Powers and Exclusive Congressional Powers

The existence of the executive's inherent national security
powers to detain prisoners of war explains, in part, why the
courts have accorded the executive greater deference in cases involving the detention of persons deemed "enemy combatants."
These cases, however, also raise the constitutional question of
whether the executive may deny or limit the rights of those it
detains by purporting to try them as "enemy combatants" in military tribuna ls and preventing them from seeking judicial review
in federal court, including habeas corpus review.
The November 13 Military Order explicitly states the President's intent to preclude the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over those detained and tried under the order. 291 The
executive has claimed that the November 13 Military Order does
not, however, preclude habeas corpus review at least to anyone
arrested under it in the United States. 292 However, the November 13 Miliary Order's language, and the President's actions to
physically bar U.S. citizens in U.S. military prisons from meeting
with counsel, strongly indicate that the executive intended to
limit the scope of habeas corpus review solely to challenges involving the tribunal's jurisdiction over particular individuals. 293
The outcomes in the "enemy combatant" decisions to date
291

Section 7(b) of the November 13 Military Order provides in pertinent part that

the :
military tribunals [established by the directive] shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by [any individual subject to the Order]; and
the individudal shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States,
or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.
November 13 Military Order, supra note 17; see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note
16, at 23-24 (concluding that the Defense Military Order Number One, which estab lished the procedures for the implementation of the November 13 Military Order ,
strictly forbid federal judicial review of all aspects of any proceeding undertaken
under the November 13 Military Order); Paust, supra note 256, at 679-81 (same).
292 White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzalez has stated that "judicial review in
civilian courts," is present under the November 13 Military Order: "[A]nyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a military commission will be able to
challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus
proceeding in a federal court." Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair,
N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (emphasis added).
293 Id. See also Katyal & Tribe, supra note 259, at 1262; Bryant & Tobias, supra
note 16, at 22-24.
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have allowed the executive to unilat erally foreclose the Guanta namo Bay detainees' access to the courts or, with the exception
of the Padilla holding, 294have foreclosed any factual review of
"enemy combatant" detentions in the United States. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the district
court's holding that Guantanamo Bay detainees could not file
habeas corpus petitions for lack of territorial jurisdiction. 295 In
essence, the district court's contested construction of the habeas
corpus statute 296effectively granted the executive the unilateral
power to bar those it alone deem s "enemy combatants" from
seeking habeas corpus review by simply detaining them outside
U.S. territory. 297 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to allow the executive to physically obstruct Hamdi's
access to the courts by holding him incommunicado and by deny ing him access to counsel. Further, while Hamdi's habeas corpus
petition moved forward on the legal challenges to his detention,298unlike Padilla, Hamdi will not be able to contest the factual allegation on which the executive based its decision to label
him an "enemy combatant. "299 This has, in essence, denied
Hamdi access to any meaningful judicial review of his detention.
As such, these cases raise important constitutional issues of
separation of powers as between the executive and Congress not
previously addressed by the courts. Specifically, these cases pose
the question of whether the executive's unilateral curtailment of
habeas corpus review for Guantanamo Bay detainees and obstruct ion of any factual review in Hamdi's detention amounts to
294See supra notes 105-06 and 120-22 (discussing Padilla's limited victory to access counsel and to present factual challenges to his classification by the executive as
an "enemy combatant").
295 Initially both the D.C. District and the Central California District courts declared the habeas corpus statute to lack extraterritorial application. See supra notes
122-32 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit, however, subsequently vacated
this portion of the Central California District Court's holding, but it did so on
grounds of judicial restraint as the case was already dismissed for petitioners' lack of
standing. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has yet
to rule on this issue on the merits. Id.
296See Paust, supra note 256, at 690-91. Paust criticizes the California court's
non-extraterritorial interpretation of the habeas corpus statute as unsupported by its
plain meaning. Id. Paust argues that the court's interpretation of the statute added
the words "te rritorial" and "sovereignty" to the statute when those words were not
included by Congress, with the effect of confusing and altering its ordinary meaning.
Id. at 691.
297 See infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
298See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
under Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution which
reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public safety may require it." Many scholars agree that a textual
interpretation of the Suspension Clause requires that only Congress exercise this power. 300 Moreover, if the executive decides
to subsequently charge and try the "enemy combatants," in the
proposed military tribunals, these cases also foreshadow the
question of whether the executive can deny "enemy combatants'" access to federal courts when the Constitution is clear that
only Congress has the power to prescribe federal court jurisdiction.301 Yet, when the courts, like the Fourth Circuit, have addressed seperation of powers, the focus has been exclusively on
judicial non-interference with the political branches on matters
of national security, not on whether the executive's curtailment
or limitation of judicial review implicated exclusive congressional
powers under Article I. 302
The executive has asserted that the September 18 Joint Resolution and two provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provide congressional authorization for its issuance
of the November 13 Military Order. 303 A few scholars, the
Fourth Circuit and one district court have agreed with President
Bush, 304although many others question this conclusion. 305 Even
leaving aside the weaknesses in the claim that Congress author300 See George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty over Habeas Corpus & the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG 2o 397 (arguing that the Suspension
Clause appears in Article I of the Constitution, in a section limiting the powers of
Congress, not in Article II, which defines the powers of the president); Paust, supra
note 267, at 21 (same); ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE IMPERIALPRESIDENCY
60-61 (1973). See also infra notes 311-17 and accompanying text. Recently, the U.S .
Supreme Court also suggested that the suspension of the writ for federal executive
detentions would require some "judicial intervention." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
300 (2001) (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)). Other scholars,
however, have suggested that the president may suspend the writ in an emergency
situation, at least so long as Congress is not in session. See Martin S. Sheffer, Does
Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely? (pt . 1), 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 233, 254-55
n.85 (1999).
301 Bryant & Tobias, supra note 16, at 4-15 (discussing Congress' exclusive powers
under Article I, Section 8 and Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution to grant
federal courts jurisdiction over "cases" and "controversies.").
302 See supra notes 86-89, 99-103 and accompanying text.
303 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
304See supra notes 5, 92-98, 118-19 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 270 and accompa nying text.
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ized President Bush to issue the November 13 Military Order, 306
the president's statutory authority can only include the power to
establish the tribuna ls, not the power to curtail judicial review. 307
The sole provision that could be read to refer to the president's
power to establish military commissions provides that Congress'
establishment of court martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ does
not preclude the concurrent ju risdiction of other military tribunals as established by law.308 Nothing in this language suggests
that Congress has delegated to the executive any power to make
laws to curtail judicial review. The November 13 Military Order
and any alleged congressional support for its creation, in any
case, could not suspend habeas review, given the "longstanding
rule requiring a clear statement of congressiona l intent to repeal
habeas jurisdiction." 309
Moreover, the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act
and congressional action in response to the November 13 Military Order revea l strong congressional disapproval of President
Bush's purported abrogation of federal court jurisdiction. 310
During the negotiation of the USA PATRIOT Act, fot example,
Congress rejected President Bush's request to authorize the attorney genera l to certify for indefinite detention any non-U.S.
citizen, whether legal or illegal, whom the official deemed a naId.
is also debatable that even if courts were to conclude that Congress did, in
fact, authorize the president to curtail judicial review, that such delegation would be
constitutional were it to amount to a suspension of the writ. There are several opposing views on the meaning of the Suspension Clause. Compare WILLIAMF.
DUKER,A CONSTITUTIONAL
HrsTORYOF HABEASCORPUS126-56 (1980) (arguing
that the framers intended the clause to limit Congress' powers to curb the writ in
state courts but not to disallow the writ in federal court) with Eric M. Freedman,
The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF.L. REv. 451 (1996) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the clause to limit Congress' ability to narrow
federal habeas corpus). This Article only discusses whether the president may unilaterally suspend the writ, and does not take a position on whether Congress could
authorize the president to suspend it as to the "enemy combatants" who are tried in
military tribunals.
308 Section 821 of the Uniform Code . of Military Justice provides that statutory
provisions for cour t-martia l jurisdiction "do not deprive military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (West
2003).
309 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 259, at 1307 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
297-98 (2001)).
310 Bryant & Tobias, supra note 16, at 398.
306

307 It
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tional security threat, subject only to ministerial review. 311 Also,
since then Congress has debated the constitutionality of the November 13 Military Order. 312 As a result of these debates, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation to circumscribe military
detainment and trials much more narrowly, and impose considerably greater procedural safeguards,3 13 including subjecting det entions under the order's authority to the supervision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 314
Thus, the executive's unilat era l decisions to proscribe federal
court jurisdiction and to bar or substantially inhibit habeas
corpus review raise significant separation of powers concerns.
The president's proscription of federal court jurisdiction in the
November 13 Military Order, without congressional authoriza tion, should be declared unconstitutional since Congress alone
has the power to proscribe such jurisdiction. 315 On similar
grounds, courts should consider the constitutionality of the executive's bar or obstruction of the detainees' habeas corpus petitions. This analysis should consider whether the executive may
exercise the power to limit or suspend the writ unilaterally in
times of national security.
The Supreme Court has not definitively settled whether the
president could ever exercise the power to suspend or limit the
writ unilaterally. 316 However, judicial precedent has strongly disId. at 387-91.
These concerns include whether President Bush abused his constitutional authority by establishing the military trib unals and whether the Order violates the Bill
of Rights. Id. at 395-97.
313 Id. at 396-98 (discussing Bill 1941 introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy). For
example, the bill would authorize military detainment and trial of only those persons
"app rehended in Afghanistan, fleeing from Afghanistan, or in or fleeing from any
other place outside of the United States where there is armed conflict involving the
Armed Forces of the United States." Id. at 397 (citing S. 1941, § 1941(a)(3)).
American citizens and lawful permanent residents would also be excluded. Id.
314 Id. at 397-98 (citing to S. 1941, § S(d)).
315 See Bryant & Tobias, supra not e 16 (concluding that the November 13 Military Order violates separation of powers insofar as it purports to usurp congressional power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III,
Section 2, and congressional power over the original jurisdiction of the lower courts
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution).
316 See Rutherglen, supra note 300, at 400. Paradoxically, this lack of certainty is
attr ibuted to the fact that even in the midst of the nation's greatest crisis, the political branches have not been willing to test the limits of their power by, for example,
consistent ly acting jointly to "limit" (but not entire ly suspend) the writ. Id. ( explaining that Congress has purposefully never entirely shut off all avenues of judicial
relief because when it has taken action to limit the writ it has done so with qualifications that preserve the role of the ordinary civil courts). See also Developments in
311
312
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favored suspension when th e president has acted unilaterally to
strip the courts of habeas corpus review. For example, when
President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas
corpus during the Civil War, 317 Chief Justice Taney declared his
actions unconstitutional, 318 compelling President Lincoln to seek
retroactive approval from Congress. 319 Moreover, despite language in President Roosevelt's Order to foreclose the saboteurs'
access to the courts, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin rejected the argument that defendants did not have standing to file
habeas corpus petitions to challenge the constitut ionality of the
military commissions who tried them. 320 Similarly, in In re
the Law, The Suspension Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1970) (observing
that the practice of the political branches in suspending the writ has been in accord
with the principle that Congress has the sole power to suspend the writ, insofar as
the executive has consistently acted pursuant to delegated authority).
317 President Lincoln's Order authorized the arrest without a trial of "'disloyal
citizens"' and "anyone who expressed sympathy with the South." Melissa K. Mat thews, Restoring The Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President Bush's New
Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINEJ. Pus. L. & PoL'Y 455, 465-66 (2002). Lincoln
imprisoned more than 13,000 citizens, among them draft resisters, newspaper editors, judges, lawyers , and legislators . Id.
318 Chief Justice Roger Taney, while sitting in the U.S. Circuit in Baltimore, declared President Lincoln's suspension of the writ unconstitutional. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No . 9487) ("I can see no ground whatever
for supposing that the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can
authorize the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or the arres t
of a citizen, except in aid of the judicia l power.") Justice Douglas in his concurrence
in Youngstown cited Ex parte Merryman to note that the president alone has no
power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 631 n.1 (1952).
319 Congress acted promptly to endorse the president's actions by enacting legislation approving wha t Lincoln had done. Confiscation Act of 1861, S.25, 37th Cong.
(1861).
320 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (discussing holding in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), stating that Congress "has not withdrawn [jurisdiction], and
the Executive branch of the Government could not, unless there was suspension of
the writ [of] .. . habeas corpus." Specifically, the Court recognized that military
commissions decisions can be "set aside" when there is "clear conviction that they
are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted."
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. The Court affirmed that the "duty ... rests on the
courts in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty." Id. at 19. The Court in Ex parte Quirin did limit,
however, the scope of its review to avoid detailed inquiry into the military's compliance with the Articles of War as enacted by Congress. See Rutherglen, supra note
300, at 401-02. The factual and historical background in Ex parte Quirin may have
had a lot to do with this limited review, including the haste with which President
Roosevelt rushed the prisoners toward trial and the strength of the charges against
them. Id. See also A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 309.
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Yamashita ,321 the Court affirmed that the executive "could not
... withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make such
inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by
habeas corpus. "322
In re Yamashita has particular relevance to the Guantanamo
Bay detainees' habeas corpus petitions because the facts surrounding the detainees' situation are more analogous to the facts
in In re Yamashita than to the facts in Eisentrager. Yamashita's
offenses and military trial occurred in the Philippines, which
were then in U.S. possession. 323 In contrast, in Eisentrager, decided four years after In re Yamashita, the Court did not hear the
habeas corpus petitions of German combatants tried in military
tribunals in China for alleged war crimes committed in Japan.
Instead, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because neither
the crime nor the trial took place inside U.S. territory. 324 The
courts relied on Eisentrager to dismiss the Guantanamo Bay detaine es' petitions on similar grounds. 325 Guantanamo Bay, however, like the Philippines, is in the possession and control of the
United States and thus, does not fall outside U.S. jurisdiction. 326
Moreover, some of those detained in Guantanamo Bay could establish jurisdiction if they are charged with terrorist acts that occurred inside the United States. Furthermore, since Eisentrager,
courts have not always read the same extra-territorial restriction
to the habeas corpus statute. For example, courts have recognized habea s corpus jurisdiction when those being tried in military tribunals outside U.S. territory are U.S. service men, even if
the crimes did not occur in the United States. 327 Similarly, courts
have heard habeas corpus petition s by foreign nationals not in
the United States. 328 Thus, Eisentrager should be limited to its
facts based on important legal distinctions.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9.
Id.
323 Id. at 5-6.
321
322

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950).
This outcome is not surprising. In fact, some have perceptively suggested that
the president appears to have constructed Guantanamo Bay according to specifications derived from Eisentrager precisely to avoid confrontation with the judiciary
regarding the writ of habeas corpus. Rutherglen, supra note 300, at 403-04.
326 See Paust, supra note 256, at 691-92; see also Paust, Courting Illegality, supra
note 267, at 23-24 (arguing that territory within U.S. jurisdiction should include any
foreign-occupied territory).
327 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973).
328 See Paust, supra note 256, at 692 n.2 (citing several cases). See also supra
notes 131-32 (discussing the D.C. District Court's attempt to distinguish cases when
324
325
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For example, the Eisentrager military trials tried combatants
who were nationals of a country against which Congress ·had issued a formal declaration of war for their commission of war
crimes. Moreover, the laws of war authorized the detention and
trial of the Eisentrager petitioners because they were accused of
committing war crimes recognized under humanitarian law.329
Thus, in Eisentrager, the executive acted in matters of national
security with clear congressional authorization and in keeping
with international humanitarian law.330 In contrast, Guantanamo
Bay detainees are being held without any resolution as to their
status as combatants, and if combatants, then their status as
"prisoners of war" or "unlawful combatants." Moreover, unless
Guantanamo Bay is declared to be U.S. territory, the executive's
unilateral decision to detain the alleged combatants is inconsistent with international humanitarian law which prescribes that
combatants must be detained in the territory of the party to the
conflict that retains custody, or in the "occupied territory" where
the hostilities took place. 331 These issues were among those that
petitioners raised in their habeas corpus petitions. 332 However,
the courts did not adequately consider the s~paration of powers
implications arising from their acquiescence in the executive's
manipulation of the habeus corpus statute to suspend its application to the Guantanamo Bay detainees.
With respect to Hamdi and Padilla, the courts have not entirely foreclosed their habeus corpus petitions, although courts
have accorded the executive the utmost deference in their renon-U.S. citizens outside the United States were granted habeas corpus review from
the Guantanamo Bay detainees).
329 Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides that a "Party to the conflict" or an "Occupying
Power," may detain, without a trial, those who are "definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State," and even this is only permitted within the country's own territory or in the occupied territory. Geneva
Convention Re lative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, (subdivision (art. 5)), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290. The German
defendants in Eisentrager were convicted of violating the laws of war by engaging in,
permitting, or ordering continued military activity against the United States after
surrender of Germany and before surrender of Japan. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
330 See Rutherglen, supra note 300, at 403 (noting that the facts in Eisentrager
contri buted to its holding : "Denying access to the petitioners would have no effect
on the rights of citizens, or of noncombatants, or even of combatants not charged
with war crimes.") .
331 See supra note 324.
332 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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view.333 Greater judicial deference to the political branches is
undoubtedly warranted and required by the U.S. Constitution in
times of national crisis.334 The more difficult question for courts
to answer, however, is exactly how much deference. Too much
judicial acquiescence could permit oth er constitutional violations, including separation of powers as between the executive
and Congress. One such example was the Fourth Circuit's decision to allow the executive to deny Hamdi access to a lawyer and
its refusal to under take any factual review of his detention, even
after the executive conceded that the "some evidence" standard
should govern. 335 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit ignored the
long historical precedent of courts conducting at least some review of the factual determinations made by the executive, 336
even in areas where the political branches have enjoyed plenary
power. 337 The Fourth Circuit also ignored the modern reality of
factual review of detentions in habeas corpus petitions. The
Fourt Circuit's reliance solely on Ex parte Quirin to conclude
that the executive's factual averments in the affidavit were sufficient to confirm that Hamdi's detention conformed with a legitimate exercise of Article II war powers 338 was, at best, misguided.
In Ex parte Quirin, the Court conducted no factual review, as
most of the facts were stipulated and undisputed. 339
See supra notes 87-104 and 105-22 and accompanying text.
Id.
335 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2003).
336 John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA.
J. lNT'L L. 93, 156 (2002) (explaining that during the nineteenth century, a court
reviewing a detention decision on habeas would make its own determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence). See also Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of
Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv.1079, 1089
(1995) (explaining that at English common law, habeas corpus required a showing of
"sufficient cause" for detention, which required not only that such detention be jus tified by law but also addressed the factual basis for the legal violation that permitted the det ent ion).
337 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306-07 (2001) (while examining the writ as it
existed in 1789, observing that courts generally reviewed whether ther e was some
evidence to support the facts of a deportation order). See also Jonathan L. Hafetz,
Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration
Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2522 (1998).
338 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473.
339 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942). Further, scholars have cautioned
against over reliance on Ex parte Quirin, where justices and scholars alike have
since lamented its holding. See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 320, at 330-32 (discussing a number of considerations that warrant restricting the opinion in Ex parte Quirin, including the alacrity with which the government prosecuted the saboteurs and
the Supreme Court ratified the military commission deliberations as well as the com333
334
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The Fourth Circuit's denial to Hamdi of what had been histori cally standard habeas review meant the court may have violated
the Suspension Clause, if the latter is to be understood as a guar antee of habeas relief. As Professor Gerald L. Neuman has explained, "[i]f one reads the Suspension Clause as a guarantee of
habeas relief, the obvious question presented is: What habeas
relief?" 340 In other words, what amounts to a "suspension" of
the writ shou ld inquire into whether habeas relief must guaran tee at minimum the common law right of habeas corpus, as it was
understood when the Constitution was ratified, or whether
habeas relief should also encompass subsequent statutory expansions of the right, and, if so, which ones? 341 Courts have yet to
decide the exact scope of judicial inquiry guaranteed by the Suspension Clause, although they do agree that it must incorporate
minimally the common law writ of habeas corpus as it existed in
1789.342 Therefore, whenever courts deny the minimum habeas
corpus review traditionally available to detainees on its own or in
acquiescence to the executive, they must consider the effect on
the Suspension Clause, as Congress alone must act to suspend
the writ, even in times of national emergency. 343
C. Balancing the Government's Need for National Security

Secrets and The Public's Right To Know
"What Their Government is Up To"
Finally, in the post -September 11 cases, some courts have been
motivated to limit the government's ability to retain national security secrets by their desire to safeguard the public's role in
holding the executive accountable to the rule of law. In the
FOIA litigation, the D.C. Federal District Court ordered the executive to release to the pub lic the names of the detainees and of
plication of rationalizing the Court's determination after the United States invoked
a quickly-drafted per curium order to execute six of the eight petitioners).
340 Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St.
Cyr, 33 CoLUM . HuM. RTs. L. REv. 555, 590 (2002).
341 Id.
342 See Hafetz, supra note 337, at 2717. See also Neuman, supra note 340, at 589
(discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's St. Cyr opinion and explaining that the Court
applied the minimum 1789 standard while deciding not to elaborate on the full scope
of the privilege protected by the Suspension Clause because such inquiry would require resolution of difficult constitutional questions that were better avoided by the
statutory interpretation the Court adopted).
343 See supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text.
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their lawyers. 344 The reversal of the order by th e Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also provok ed a strong dissent
that affirmed the district court's conclusions. 345 Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit ordered the executive to open its immigration hear ings to the public. 346 These opinions · acknowledged the executive's need to protect national security secrets. Nonethe less, the
opinions imposed strict judicial standards of review, requiring the
government to prove its need to keep the information secret
under the FOIA, or to narrowly tailor its claims for secrecy by
conducting case-by-case determinations about the need to close
.
immigration hearings. 347
These cases mirror the U.S. Supreme Court's exceptional holding in New York Times declining to enjoin newspapers from publishing the contents of a classified historical study of U.S.
Vietnam War policy.348 In that case, severa l of the Justices were
similarly pers uaded that the founding fathers intended the First
Amendment to protect the principles that an informed public is a
fundamental tenet of a representative government, and that open
debate and discussion of public issues is often the only guarantee
against tyranny. 349 This policy objective alone, however, did not
344
345
346
347
348
349

See supra notes 154-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971).
Id. at 717 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black notes

that:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the pro tection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy .... The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and
inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.
Id. Justice Douglas adds: "The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to
prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information ... ·. Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating
bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our
national health." Id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., concurring). In his
concurrence, Justice Stewart writes:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other
areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy
and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie
in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion
which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For
this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an
informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.
Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring).
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determine the outcome in New York Times. Underlying severa l
of the case's six separate concurring opinions and three separate
dissenting opinions were additional considerations about the nature of the Vietnam War. Those considerations strengthened the
Justices' resolve to allow this policy objective to trump the executive's interest in protecting national security secrets. 350 First, several of the opinions reveal the Court's deep schism, shared by a
great deal of the public, over the government's policy in Vietnam.351 Second, several of the opinions reveal tremendous reluctance in according th e executive inherent power s to decide
unilaterally when to protect national security secret s in the absence of a declared war 352or statutory au.thorization. 353 Finally,
several opinions reveal skepticism that the materials the executive sought to enjoin from publication implicated national security secrets. 354
350Justices White, Stewart, and Marshall also expressed significant concern that
the Court's grant of an injunction would amount to the creation of a remedy not
legislated by Congress. See id. This issue is not present in the September 11 litigation, however .
351For example, Justice Black refers to the duty of the press to disclose information as paramount to "prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot
and shell." Id. at 717 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
352Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., concurring) ("The power to wage
war is 'the power to wage war successfully.' But the war power stems from a declaration of war.") (internal citations omitted).
353In his concurring opinion, Justice Black writes: "The Government does not
even attempt to rely on any act of Congress ....
To find that the president has
'inherent power' to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe
out the First Amendment. ... " Id. at 718-19 ((Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice White states in his concurring opinion that:
At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of
the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having
such sweeping potential for inhibiting publ ications by the press.
Id. at 732 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Marshall
writes: "The Executive Branch has not gone to Congress and requested that the
decision to provide such power [prior restraint] be reconsidered. Instead, the Executive Branch comes tq this Court and asks that it be granted the power Congress
refused to give." Id. at 746-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
354Justice Black's concurring opinion states: "The word 'security' is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment." Id. at 719 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas writes:
We start then with a case where there already is rather wide distribution of
the material that is destined for publicity, not secrecy. I have gone over the
material listed in the in camera brief of the United States. It is all history,
not future events. None of it is more recent than 1968.
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Few courts since the New York Times decision have rejected
an executive nondisclosure position in matters that implicate national security secrets. 355 This result can be explaine d, in part, by
the absence of some or all of the considerations that influenced
the Court's holding in the New York Times litigation. Put another way, the revival of the New York Times decision in the
September 11 litigation can be explained, in part, by the fact that
similar factors to those present in the New York Times litigation
also permeate the current domestic war on terrorism. These factors include concerns that the executive has exceeded statutory
authorization or acted unilaterally to conduct law enforcement
practices that fall outside the scope of national security, and that
raise significant civil rights concerns. In the FOIA litigation, for ·
example, the D.C. Federal District Court expressed skepticism
that the information the executive refused to disclose implicated
national security secrets. In addition, the D.C. District Court
held misgivings about executive misconduct, particularly as to
the treatment of material witnesses. 356 Similarly, in the immigration hearing cases, the Sixth Circuit expressed concern that the
executive's unilateral decision to close immigration hearings had
already resulted in indiscriminate discretion and abuses of
power. 357 In contrast, the Third Circuit considered any detrimental effect of closed deportation hearings on civil liberties as neeId. at 723 n.3 (Dougla s, J., joined by Black, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Brennan
writes:
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a
time of war, or if the power or presently available armaments would justify
even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion
a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions, has the Government
presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the
material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature.
Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
355 See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 43, at 351 (observing that in the [fifteen]
years since the New York Times case, there has been a "considerab le enhancement
of executive power in areas of national security secrecy, an aggrandizement significantly assisted by the Supreme Court, with Congress noticeably absent from the
discourse."); Kaplan, supra note 43, at 1807 (observing that "[w]hile New York
Times marks the only time the Supreme Court has rejected an executive nondisclosure position in the national security context, courts of appeals and district courts
have invalidated executive national security classifications ... although these are
exceptional."); Ferguson, supra note 43, at 452 (observing that in the [twenty] years
since the New York Times decision, "the Court consistently has deferred to the factual and policy judgments of the executive branch in cases dealing with official
secrets.").
356 See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
357 See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.

1048

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81, 2002]

essary to protect national security. 358 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia did not even address the
need to balance the executive's demands for national security
secrets with the civil liberties concerns associated with the secret
detentions. 359 Thus, the judge s' perceptions that the executive
was acting beyond the scope of that required to protect national
secur ity explains the noteworthy judicial resolve in cases to pro tect the policy objective articulated in New York Times of preserving the public's ability to hold the government accountable
to the ru le of law.
CONCLUSION

Times of national security crisis have offered the executive its
best arguments for augmenting its power, even if it means suspending civil liberties. 360 After September 11, the threat to the
fundamental rights to life and personal integrity of all U.S. residents and citizens residing abroad has now become even more
palpable. No doubt, these are frightening times for our nation.
The U.S. government is certainly justified (and arguab ly required) to act zealously to protect the public from the threat of
terrorism. Yet, in the face of such fear, one of the great challenges facing the United States is its ability to maintain a sensible
perspective on national security issues. 361 The sacrifice of civil
liberties during such national security emergencies features
prominently in U.S. history. 362 The new "war on terrorism" pro vides no exception.
As in the past, judges have been among the first called to the
difficult task of balancing the competing interests of collective
security and individual rights. Yet, courts have "long viewed the
conduct of ... national security as largely beyond the province[ s]
See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
See WILLIAMH. REHNQUIST,ALL THE LAWS BuT ONE: CIVILLIBERTIESIN
WARTIME(1998) (arguing that increased use of government power in time of national security crisis should preempt civil liberties).
361 See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 43, at 349.
362 See Bucklin, supra note 48 (documenting laws and executive acts that infringed on civil liberties including the Alien and Sedition Acts; President Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War; the Espionage, Sedition, and Alien Acts of 1917-1918; the 1938 Hous e Committee of Un-American Activities (HUAC); the internment of Japan ese Americans during WWII; the Smith
Act of 1940; President Truman's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty and
HUA C re-emergence during the Cold War; the McCarran Act of 1950; and President Nixon's infamous secret police (the "P lumbers").
358
359
360
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of ju dicial inquiry or interference." 3 63 This view rests on "separa tion of powers concerns that emphasize the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers to the political branches," as well as
the courts' sense of institutional incompetence to resolve matters
of national security. 364 Courts may indeed prefer that Congress
be charged with reviewing the executive's actions. 365 This does
not mean, however, that courts should not have a significant role
in examin ing the post-September 11 cases. As these cases have
revealed, for examp le, many of the executive's actions since September 11 fall principally within the scope of law enforcement ,
not national security. One important role of the courts, there fore, is to determine whether the cases even raise a political
question before deferring to the political bra nches. Moreover ,
these cases have raised separation of powers concerns, insofar as
the executive appears to have exceeded the reasonable scope of
any inherent execu tive powers in national securi ty affairs by proscribing federal court and habeas corpus jurisdiction without congressional approval. Certainly it is also within the scope of
judicial inquiry to examine whether the political branches have
been faithful to the struct ural requirements of the checks and
balances embedded in the Constitution. Finally, times of na tional security crisis also offer the executive its most compelling
reasons to retain government secrets. However, particularly
when grave civil liberites concerns are at stake, courts do have a
role in ensuring that the executive does not rely solely on specu lative or unsubstantiated assertions about the need for secrecy.
"The word 'security' is a broad , vague generality whose contours
shou ld not be invoked to abrogate the fun damental law embod ied in the First Amendment. "366

363
364
365

Ferguson , supra note 43, at 452.
Id.
Id. at 453.

366 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U .S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., joined by
Douglas, J., concurring) .

